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Introduction 
 
 I write in pursuit of the question: what is the difference between Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
overman and the posthuman foretold by transhumanists? Of course, in this question I make the 
hypothesis that they are in fact distinct propositions. I do not doubt that this has colored my 
perspective. I have read many convincing arguments that they are the same. I choose my side 
because I have experienced what Nick Bostrom calls “the yuck factor,” a reflexive sense of 
moral disgust at radically new technologies (Bostrom 1, 5). But it is not technological progress 
that offends me. I see efforts to incorporate man into machine already in place throughout the 
world. How long have we had artificial limbs or the iron lung? How adrift do I feel when my 
phone dies? How many imbibe concoctions to improve their mood or sharpen their focus? 
Babette Babich writes “we are (already) transhuman” (Tuncel, 102), and I feel it. I think the 
smartphone is the most telling example. It is inseparably attached to us. For some it has grown 
from the pocket, to the wrist, to the ears. Soon it will cover our eyes. We think in terms of it. We 
talk to it. We hold our friends, our memories, our directions, our entertainment in it. I could 
hardly buy groceries without it. But it makes things so much easier! Why shouldn’t we continue 
to enhance ourselves and grow through scientific ingenuity? For one, I doubt that technology has 
driven us out of the nihilism Nietzsche identified as the greatest ill of mankind more than 100 
years ago. A new study comes out every week. “Instagram ranked worst for young people’s 
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mental health” “The relationship between addiction to smartphone usage and depression among 
adults: a cross sectional study” If my phone, and the astonishing technological innovations it 
contains beneath that shiny black surface, is a value, then it is not one that gives me meaning. I 
grow to resent it. Even as I rely on it more and more, I only resent it more. It stands resolutely in 
the way of my social relationships and my self-reliance. Martin Heidegger foretold a future 
where the technological method of relating to the world overcomes all others. Where humans 
only regard other humans as objects, standing-by, waiting to be used for some further end. 
Eventually, we may understand ourselves as only objects, without internal purpose, buried 
underneath layers of Technik. I believe we are close to this destiny, and transhumanism risks 
pushing us still closer.  
 Still I could live with this. Maybe it is better to continue on a dark road than to hack 
through the forest. No, I am not offended by technological progress. I am offended by the blatant 
commercialism of the transhumanist project and the insane desire to live forever. 
Transhumanism is not a philosophy; it is a marketing scheme. It is a growing network of 
scammers keen to play on your fear of old age and death. They offer human perfection and 
immortality, at a steep price. Babich calls it science fiction, all of their products lie decades in the 
future (I’ll take the cash upfront). I love science fiction, but not when people mortgage their 
homes or cash out their life insurance policies on a dream and a freezer in Arizona set to house 
their brain for untold years. The last place I wanna go when I die is Scottsdale, Arizona. But I do 
want to die. Not now, but eventually. Everybody needs to die eventually. The reason is the same 
one that drove Nietzsche to come up with a species beyond man, the overman; the people around 
today are not good enough to be around forever. If you transhumanists say you want to improve 
the human, I might tentatively agree, but Nazi Germany would lurk in the back of my mind. 
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Wait. You can’t possibly mean you want to improve the very same humans alive today? 
Forever!? The same ones raping the Earth and blinking about it? It’s fine, you say, we’ll enhance 
them with technology. Their values will have to change when they can think 100x faster. No. 
There’s a limit. A limit called death. A limit to how much enhancement one body or one soul can 
take, and if you tell me there’s no limit then I’ll tell you you’re talking about God, and even God 
is dead (GS, 125).  
 I have found two significant differences between Nietzsche’s overman and the 
posthuman: 
1. Nietzsche does not advocate for the extension of the human life in pursuit of the 
overman. Quite the opposite, it will take many generations of births and deaths to 
bring about the overman. Overlong lives block the way to the overman. Life 
extension is a universal principle of transhumanism. 
2. Nietzsche hates the value of equality. He despises its Christian origins. He argues 
that structural inequality, even a rigid caste structure, is most beneficial for 
bringing about the higher and highest types of man. Every transhumanist pays 
homage to equality. 
These points make up Chapters 3 and 4 of my project. The second chapter presents an overview 
of popular transhumanist voices and their specific deviations from Nietzschean principles.  
In Chapter 3, on life extension and its opposite, willed death, I analyze the prologue and 
23rd chapter of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Zarathustra’s speeches in the prologue are underscored 
by the timely fall of the tightrope walker. As he attempts to travel from end to end, from man to 
overman, he is surpassed and dies. This will happen to all of us in our crossings, but still, the 
crossing furthers species man towards its goal, the overman, which is also its own demise. To go 
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over, we must go under. My main interlocutor is Laurence Lampert in his book, Nietzsche’s 
Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathutra. 
Chapter 4 opposes the Christian, slave moral of equality with Nietzsche’s preferred 
political system for bringing about the maximization and overcoming of man, a rigid aristocracy 
or the establishment of a new nobility. It is precisely inequality that improves the few. The 
mediocre are required to toil beneath them for the good of the advancement of the higher. I work 
between Tracy Strong and Martin Heidegger. Heidegger helps me interpret Nietzsche’s 
conception of the transformation of values through will to power as art, while Strong portrays the 
coming of the overman as the historical progression from slave morality, to a master morality, 
and finally to the morality of the overman. I reveal that my understanding of Nietzsche’s 
relationship with death is akin to Heidegger’s being-toward-death. Death orients you towards a 
goal. In Nietzsche’s case, the goal of the overman requires your death. Your striving and 
overcoming, then, are focused entirely on life. While death both enables the coming of the 
overman and permits you to work towards him. 
I conclude with a brief recapitulation of my argument.  
There is excellent academic work on the relationship between Nietzsche and 
transhumanism. I believe the conversation begins with Peter Sloterdijk’s controversial Rules for 
the Human Zoo. He reads all of humanism as a mission of taming the beast man. He opposes this 
to a lineage of philosophers focused on breeding man that stretches from Plato, to Nietzsche, and 
finally Heidegger. With rapid developments in our ability to manipulate the human genome, 
these human breeding projects have a new scientific foothold. He sees the implementation of 
such projects as inevitable and coming fast. In anticipation, we must establish ethical guidelines 
around human breeding now. “Because abstaining or omitting will eventually be insufficient, it 
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will become necessary in the future to formulate a codex of anthropotechnology and to confront 
this fact actively” (Sloterdijk, 24). Sloterdijk reveals the eugenic possibilities of transhumanism. 
Most transhumanists focus on the benefits they can provide to the living, they often omit the 
potential to craft embryo according to our whim. Still less do they acknowledge that such 
decisions might eventually fall into the hands of the state, in a system resembling fascist 
eugenics.  
Jürgen Habermas reacts negatively to Sloterdijk’s provocation in The Future of Human 
Nature. He offers a definition of a liberal eugenics, “a practice that entrusts interventions into the 
genome of an embryo to the discretion of the parents,” but he also takes issue with this perhaps 
more tolerable form of genetic intervention (Habermas, 78). He argues that the genetic 
manipulation of an embryo with no ability to consent restricts the freedom of choice it will gain 
when it is born. Further, working between Kant’s categorical imperative and Aristotle’s 
distinction of grown and made, he argues that the child may not be able to fully participate in the 
kingdom of ends. They might see themselves as something made rather than natural and thus not 
truly an end.  
From this point, Stefan Sorgner takes credit for discovering the connection between 
transhumanism and Nietzsche. He has made it his work to respond to every essay in the narrow 
field. He has even established a conference series on posthuman studies entitled Beyond 
Humanism. He is most adamant that transhumanism follows in Nietzsche’s footsteps and has 
made this argument on multiple counts.  
Since, a number of noted Nietzsche scholars have weighed into the debate. Their 
conversations are recorded in the very helpful collection, Nietzsche and Transhumansim: 
Precursor or Enemy, edited by Yunus Tuncel. Keith Ansell Pearson, who translated the first text 
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of Nietzsche’s I ever read, buys the connection whole cloth. He has written on the subject in his 
own text Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and Transhuman Condition. He argues for a 
more complex understanding of transhumanism than I have been able to provide here. He notes 
its movement as a cultural meme beyond published authors. Paul Loeb inserts Eternal 
Recurrence into the conversation. He urges transhumanists to consider Nietzsche’s teachings on 
time and not fall into the spirit of revenge, the feeling of impotence at our inability to will 
backwards, but he maintains a favorable position regarding the correlation between Nietzsche 
and transhumanism.  
The two essays I found most helpful were Babette Babich’s Nietzsche’s Post-Human 
Imperative: On the “All-too-Human” Dream of Transhumanism and Yunus Tuncel’s The 
Question of Pain and Suffering in Nietzsche and Transhumanism. Babich’s essay is beautifully 
written, witty, and informative. Her comments can be found throughout this paper. I took most 
seriously her claim, “The technological singularity is all about not dying. Transhumanism is all 
about not dying” (Tuncel, 120). These words opened the door to my second chapter. I agree with 
her and I do not think that Nietzsche or the overman is all about not dying. She is the only writer 
in the collection to take a strong position against the connection between Nietzsche and 
transhumanism. She also raises an economic concern about transhumanism that I take very 
seriously but do not study closely in this paper. Tuncel studies the question of death directly. He 
writes, “Death is part of life and it is a sign of overhumanly power to know when to die, which 
Zarathustra calls ‘free death’” (Tuncel, 228). You can find my thoughts on “On Free Death” in 
section b of Chapter 2. In the editor’s introduction, an odd privilege to summarize your own 
paper, “Tuncel concludes that Nietzsche and transhumanist thought are more similar than 
 7 
different” (Tuncel, 11). I side with them in this paper, with a particular focus on the relation to 
death and values that most effectively bring about Nietzsche’s overman. 
 
A Brief Note on Gender: 
 The German word Mensch denotes human, but is often translated as man. For ease of 
grammar and interaction with source material, I will bounce between both. The meaning is 
always the species human.  
 There is some discussion on the translation of Übermensch. I follow Del Caro and 
Pippin’s ‘overman.’ The injection of -hu- breaks the sound of the original. The prefix super- 
recalls the man from Krypton and loses the “word play” of “going under and going over” (TSZ, 
5).   
  
 
Transhumanists 
 
I define transhumanism as the belief in the augmentation of the human body by 
technological means. Francis Fukuyama provides a critical perspective on the worldview that 
inspires transhumanism. “As ‘transhumanists’ see it, humans must wrest their biological destiny 
from evolution’s blind process of random variation and adaptation and move to the next stage as 
a species” (Fukuyama, 42). The next stage involves the technological control and enhancement 
of every conceivable biological process: from eating and disposing, to the efficiency of the 
immune system, and even the cognitive processes of the brain. Where adaptations in such 
biological processes were understood to occur across generations through evolution, and thus far 
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beyond individual human control, the introduction of nanotechnology and genetic manipulation 
will allow scientists to optimize these functions at will. Transhumanists believe strongly in 
pursuing and employing these technologies towards the improvement of and beyond the human.  
In this chapter, I will explore the work of some significant transhumanists, and begin to 
draw distinctions between their project and the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The 
Nietzschean concepts I introduce here will be further explored in later chapters  
 
Ray Kurzweil 
Ray Kurzweil, in his book The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, 
portrays his vision of the transhuman future. His term, singularity, refers to the “culmination of 
the merger of our biological thinking and existence with our technology, resulting in a world that 
is still human but that transcends our biological roots. There will be no distinction, post-
singularity, between human and machine nor between physical and virtual reality” (Kurzweil, 7). 
Kurzweil looks towards the end goal of transhumanism in which human and machine become 
one. If transhumanism is the process by which scientists attempt to overcome the biological 
limitations we currently face (e.g. disease, a brain limited by the speed and connectivity of our 
synapses, and most notably, death), then the singularity is the final destination in which these 
boundaries have been far surpassed by both the placement of machine elements in the human 
body and the development of machines that more closely resemble the human. To crudely 
represent Kurzweil’s argument in Friedrich Nietzsche’s terms, by the maximization of will to 
power (through technological means alone), the Overman is near. The great distinction that I 
would draw between these two visions of the future is the promise of personal salvation. 
Kurzweil’s singularity is an ideal that you yourself can reach. “We will gain power over our 
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fates. Our mortality will be in our own hands…By the end of this century, the nonbiological 
portion of our intelligence will be trillions of trillions of times more powerful than unaided 
human intelligences” (Kurzweil, 9). Even as he disavows utopia, Kurzweil repeatedly conjures 
up fantastic scenes of human perfection mere inches from your grasp. Nietzsche’s overman is a 
generational undertaking. It is a goal beyond your human reach. It will not be seen in your 
lifetime. It may never come. 
Kurzweil’s book is not overly philosophical. It is more concerned with describing the 
scientific progress in, and great potential of, human augmentation by machine. When he 
responds to ethical critiques of his coming singularity, he calls on scientific studies and theories 
rather than philosophical arguments. One chapter in his book addresses what he finds to be the 
most pressing philosophical question. It is evoked in the subtitle “Still Human?” Kurzweil’s 
answer is a resounding yes. In order to establish this claim, he calls upon two of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s ideas: will to power and the overman.  
Kurzweil defines the human as “the species that inherently seeks to extend its physical 
and mental reach beyond current limitations” (Kurzweil, 9). This is a reasonable, if brief, 
definition of will to power. I read will to power as the overcoming of limitations in both their 
internal and external manifestations. Kurzweil acknowledges only the mental aspect of the 
internal, and misses the cultural and spiritual. Roger Berkowitz has defined will to power as, “the 
natural drive for man and all beings to assert themselves in their difference and superiority over 
others” (Berkowitz, 110). In a social sense, this is correct. Will to power is the innate search for 
conflict and dominance. It asserts that every being seeks to overpower and grow in every contact 
with another being—to the detriment of the other, who must submit and retreat. The will to 
power of the other is experienced as a limitation, which must be overcome. Will to power 
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emerges in the social being “in every combination of forces, defending itself against the 
stronger, dashing at the weaker” (WP, 655). This seems utterly brutal, but Nietzsche asserts it as 
the essence of life. It is the basic fact that allows beings to persist and grow. That it comes at the 
expense of others is as necessary a consequence for Nietzsche as Newton’s third law, for every 
action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Every victory brings another’s defeat and every 
growth a corresponding contraction. There is also an internal element of will to power, which is 
intertwined with the social. It is best captured in the quote from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “I am 
that which must always overcome itself” (TSZ, 89). One does not always encounter the will to 
power of another being in the form of a physical struggle for life and death. Morals that have 
been internalized, rocks that one cannot move, and art that entrances you with its beauty are all 
understood by Nietzsche as the will to power of another being dominating your own will to 
power. Will to power also becomes an overcoming of another that you have incorporated into 
yourself as a limitation: the morals you hold were created by another, the weakness of your body 
is really the strength of the rock, your gaping awe at Michelangelo’s nonfinito Slaves is in fact 
your submission to Michelangelo’s will to power. The very nature of your life, as a need for 
dominance over your self and others, urges you to overcome these limitations. Kurzweil’s 
understanding of will to power comes close to this, but misses Nietzsche on two counts. First, 
Kurzweil defines the human as will to power. For Nietzsche, will to power is precisely life. All 
species are defined by their need to grow, expand, and overcome. Second, Kurzweil neglects a 
cultural and spiritual overcoming that is equally significant to Nietzsche, and most important to 
Heidegger’s reading of will to power as art. Heidegger defines the being by its creative and 
destructive need to legislate, or create truth from out of semblance. It strikes me that 
transhumanism focuses its technological efforts almost exclusively on the overcoming of the 
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human body. They seem to expect that any cultural transformation will occur organically when 
the technology becomes sufficiently impressive, and they have done little to directly affect the 
culture. Below, I will examine the tablets of values they have prepared. They are jumbled and 
short. They do not shine to me.  
In order to establish a relationship between his singularity and Nietzsche’s overman, 
Kurzweil calls on Max More, CEO of the Alcor Life Extension Foundation and Doctor of 
Philosophy. More invokes Nietzsche’s description of man in the opening book of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, “Man is a rope, fastened between animal and overman—a rope over an 
abyss…What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal.” The goal for More and 
Kurzweil is the singularity, the fusing of man and machine in which formerly biological 
functions are handled by nanobots and diseases and deficiencies are genetically edited out 
prebirth. For Nietzsche, the goal is the overman. The overman is also the next step in the 
evolution of the human. In this paper, I will not argue against the resemblance of their calls to 
surpass the human. I will draw distinctions between their targets and methods of overcoming. 
Unlike the transhumanists, Nietzsche does not want to overcome the biological fact of death in 
pursuit of the overman. Unlike Nietzsche, the transhumanists remain committed to the value of 
equality in breeding towards “the higher and highest types” (AC, 57). 
 
Max More 
 Max More is currently President and CEO of Alcor Life Extension Foundation. Alcor 
offers cryonic preservation. That is, they will freeze your body after your legal death. They 
adamantly prefer the term vitrification due to the importance of preventing ice formation and the 
injection of various preservative chemicals into your organs, but it involves drastically lowering 
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your body temperature1. I’ll call it freezing for ease. They will store you (if your brain in a jar is 
indeed still you) in a vat of liquid nitrogen for an indefinite amount of time. Should the 
technological possibility of revival emerge, they will endeavor to restore you to life. The cost of 
this service ranges from $80,000 (for just your brain) to $200, 000 (entire body). You can also 
fund your cryonic procedure through life insurance policies. Should you be close to death, they 
offer to monitor your deathbed in order to freeze you immediately, for an additional fee2. We 
have all heard the rumors of Walt Disney’s brain in deep freeze somewhere beneath Disneyland. 
Alcor works to bring science fiction into reality, or maybe they’re charging 80 grand to freeze 3 
pounds of meat. 
 Alcor asserts very particular definitions of the self and death. They must in order to 
market their services and operate under the law. Due to legal restrictions, cryonics cannot begin 
until death has been declared by a doctor. Thus they separate death into its legal standard, which 
they define only as the point at which modern medicine can no longer help you, and a true death 
that presumably comes later but can be indefinitely delayed through cryonics. “Cryonics is not a 
belief that the dead can be revived. Cryonics is a belief that no one is really dead until the 
information content of the brain is lost, and that low temperatures can prevent this loss3.” Alcor 
does not tie death to the ceasing of any biological function, such as the heart or lungs. They 
define death as the disruption of information content located entirely in the brain. They believe 
they can revive you someday from just your brain on ice, because this information content 
remains intact4. What, then, is this information content? More relates it to the “self” in his 
                                                     
1 Find a video of Max More describing the cryonic procedure here, https://www.singularityweblog.com/alcor-max-
more/ 
2 https://www.alcor.org/BecomeMember/scheduleA.html  
3 https://www.alcor.org/cryomyths.html emphasis original 
4 See More’s dissertation in which he argues for a similar definition of death based on information. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20040610182354/http://www.maxmore.com/disscont.htm 
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dissertation. The chapter in which he discusses death as the irreversible loss of information is 
entitled, “The Terminus of the Self.” More, and his company Alcor, thus believe that an 
individual is not dead until the self cannot be restored. They locate the self entirely in the brain, 
and name only the brain’s death as the true death of the self. More’s information content seems 
related to another term, the soul. Like the self, or the information content of your personality, the 
soul is particular to one individual. Without it, one is said to no longer be themselves. Descartes 
famously locates the soul in the pineal gland of the brain. This seems oddly similar to More’s 
assertion that the “information content” of a person is located entirely in the brain, and that one is 
only truly dead when this content has been destroyed. Whether we identify “information content” 
with the self, a connection More himself makes, or with the soul, potentially a religious 
imposition he might reject, it is most significant that we recognize that Alcor identifies the 
human brain as the seat of a person’s personhood, and because of this, believes that they can 
revive the person from only the brain. 
Nietzsche would reject the assertion that the self is located entirely in the brain. He also 
considers the relationship between the self, the soul, and the body, but from the mouth of 
Zarathustra, he calls for a revaluation of the body as the self entire. His chapter, “On the 
Despisers of the Body,” openly mocks Descartes conception of self through the separation of 
body and mind. He offers his alternative view of the relation between thought and extension. 
“But the awakened, the knowing one says: body am I through and through, and nothing besides; 
and soul is just a word for something on the body” (TSZ, 23). Here Nietzsche asserts the primacy 
of the body over the soul. The self proclaims itself to be entirely body. The soul is diminished in 
two ways. First, it is only an attachment to the body. It has no existence or significance without 
                                                     
 
 14 
the body. Second, soul is only a word. It only comes about through its naming. This suggests that 
the soul’s significance is a cultural product rather than innate fact. Zarathustra’s self is distanced 
from the soul. It declares the body as its equal. To say the body is the location of the self would 
also be inaccurate. I am my body “through and through.” The self is precisely the body5, while 
the soul is a name for one part of the body and thus only one part of the self. If More looks for 
the soul as the location of the self then he does something very unNietzschean. If he finds the 
soul or the self in a piece of the brain, which is again only a name for a part of the body, then he 
commits the same mistake as the despisers of the body. He fails to value the body as the self. 
When he excises the brain in order to preserve the self in vitrification, he despises the body. He 
rejects Nietzsche’s claim that the body is the self. In Nietzsche’s configuration, the self cannot 
exist without the body and vice-versa. 
Perhaps it is not necessary that every part of Max More’s life align with Zarathustra’s 
teaching. His dissertation, after all, is an interaction with the work of Derek Parfit that does not 
cite Nietzsche, but Alcor is the financial and practical enactment of his transhumanist ideals. He 
has chosen cryonics as his personal foray into the posthuman project. He also makes the most 
declarative statement on the connection between Nietzsche and transhumanism—going so far as 
to say, “transhumanist ideas were directly influenced by Nietzsche” (More, Tuncel, 27). I argue 
absolutely in the following chapter on Nietzsche that policies of life extension (such as cryonics) 
are not the appropriate method for bringing about the overman, but we can see already in More’s 
location of the self in the brain that his transhumanist practice is not in line with Nietzsche’s 
position. What could show more disgust with the body than to throw it away and claim that you 
have still preserved the self? Nietzsche’s call to return to the valuing of the body, which is also a 
                                                     
5 Consider the following quote that supports this claim, “he is called self. He lives in your body, he is your body” 
(TSZ, 23).  
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call to impermanence and change, is openly advocated by the transhumanists, in that they wish to 
enhance and perfect the body (note: perfection ≠ impermanence), but the practice of brain-in-a-
jar cryonics flies in its face. A crucial inescapable aspect of the body, and of impermanence, is 
degradation and death. In their devout quest for life extension6, they also ignore Nietzsche’s call 
for a generational breeding of man, but more on this in Chapter 2.  
More has been involved with Alcor since 1986. Until 1995, he also ran the Extropy 
Institute. It is currently run by his partner, Natasha Vita-More. The Extropy institute is dedicated 
to advocating for More’s particular brand of transhumanism, which he calls extropy. Extropy, 
More’s own neologism, is defined as “the extent of a system’s intelligence, information, order, 
vitality, and capacity for improvement.” It is the antithesis of entropy. He organizes 
transhumanism around the attempt to increase extropy, i.e. to push the boundaries of their 
system. In 1995, More published the first version of The Extropian Principles7. It is his account 
of the guiding values of transhumanism. Version 3.0, published 2001, is self-consciously 
inspired by Nietzsche. He is not cited, but even a quick glance makes it clear. The 6 values he 
espouses are, 
1. Perpetual Progress 
2. Self-Transformation 
3. Practical Optimism 
4. Intelligent Technology 
5. Open Society 
6. Self-Direction 
                                                     
6 Ponce de Leon would be proud, as would Francis Bacon. Cf. New Atlantis on the scientific utopia of life 
prolongation. 
7 http://vency.com/EXtropian3.htm 
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The first two are directly inspired by Nietzsche’s conception of will to power. The demand of 
will to power is that you constantly overcome yourself—that you initiate and complete numerous 
self-transformations throughout your life and never be satisfied with a single one. More aligns 
transhumanism with Nietzsche very closely by beginning his tablet of values with will to power. 
Where he falters, is in associating “an indefinite lifespan” with perpetual progress. The death of 
individual humans is crucial to the production of Zarathustra’s overman. It is necessary in every 
evolutionary process. More is not unique in this effort. Every single transhumanist I have studied 
identifies the extension of the human life as a key mission of transhumanism. Nietzsche never 
advocates fleeing from the spectre of death. He wants you to make both your life and your death 
meaningful, on your own terms. The individual will to power must meet its end when it is 
ultimately overcome by another’s. To oppose the final limit of one’s will to power, the 
unavoidability of death, is to render the striving itself meaningless. What is particularly unique in 
Nietzsche’s notion of will is that an overgoing is also a downgoing. As you seek to expand, you 
also dig at your own grave. You invite the aggression of greater wills as you expand in your own. 
It has often been said, life is meaningless without death, so too is evolution without a limit. 
Nietzsche takes this principle to the extreme. Nietzsche invites you to strive to overcome all 
limits, but it is the risk that you yourself will be overcome, and the bare fact that eventually you 
will be, that renders this ceaseless battle the organizing structure of all life and progression. If 
More wishes to organize his transhumanism in line with Nietzsche, he cannot forget the 
importance of death. But I imagine this would not make his high-tech meat packing business 
very profitable. 
The third speaks of a kind of resistance to nihilism and a search for joy. If this is not the 
teaching of Zarathustra, then it is his own personal mission. Heidegger identifies the overcoming 
 17 
of nihilism as Nietzsche’s central philosophical concern. This section is perhaps the most 
unconditionally related to Nietzsche in that it teaches both the overcoming of nihilism and the 
recreation of values. More preaches, “We maintain a constructive skepticism to the limiting 
beliefs held by our associates, our society, and ourselves8.” Zarathustra, too, preaches the 
recreation of values. He scorns the supposedly absolute truth of Christianity and humanism. In 
the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche himself attempts to trace the origin of deeply held values 
with an eye towards the possibility of their recreation. The recreation of values is a principle of 
transhumanism that I am doubtful of. Bostrom and More express the need for a recreation of 
values in the pursuit of the posthuman. Still, I cannot help but notice that they express a loyalty 
to Christian values that Nietzsche despised, most notably equality. I also notice that they tend to 
enact their transhumanism within the existing value structures of capitalism (in the case of 
More), science (de Grey), and the academic institution (Bostrom). I feel a certain need to take 
them at their word. To doubt the validity of their principles would be to do an injustice, 
especially when that principle is to constantly reexamine their principles, but I would note that 
the practice of transhumanism thus far has done little to antagonize the dominant values of 
scientific reasoning, capitalism, and democratic liberalism. Indeed, More’s principles display an 
association with them.  
More expresses an affinity to the value of equality in the fifth principle, Open Society. 
More is unique in that he does not directly invoke the word equality, like Bostrom and Kurzweil. 
This may be a product of Nietzsche’s influence, as equality was a value that he derided with 
particular vehemence. However, the spirit of capitalist democratic equality is clearly visible in 
his writing. Instead of the involuntary imposition of political authority More admires “free 
                                                     
8 You might notice that he apes a bit of Zarathustra’s dramatic, proclamatory style for his tablet of transhumanist 
values. 
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exchange” and voluntary association9. “The freedom of expression of an open society is best 
protected by a social order characterized by voluntary relationships and exchanges. We oppose 
self-proclaimed and involuntarily imposed ‘authorities.’” In his espousal of freedom of 
expression and voluntary exchange, More shows love for the hallmarks of capitalist democracy. 
In his condemnation of involuntarily imposed authorities, he even expresses a need for 
something akin to voting. Democracy is both the dominant value system of our time and a 
political structure that Nietzsche mocked. In encoding its tenets within his transhumanist 
principles, More absolutely does not look towards destroying existing values and creating new 
ones. He expresses loyalty to the dominant values of our time in a very unNietzschean manner. 
Ironically enough, the quote which most expresses the value of equality in More’s text is highly 
similar to Zarathustra’s description of the last man, the worst possible destiny of man and the one 
we are already heading towards10. “Extropians seek neither to rule or be ruled.” This is a 
statement against hierarchies of rank and in favor of a system of equality. Nietzsche found a 
natural order in such hierarchies11. Nietzsche despises equality for its slave morality, for 
fostering the weak, and for its Christian origins (Antichrist, 43). Again, this is neither a statement 
that is in line with Nietzsche’s politics nor is it a destruction of the dominant values of today. In 
claiming equality and capitalistic democracy as tenets of transhumanism, More fails to abide by 
both Nietzsche’s specific politics and the ethical position of destruction that he demands we take 
in regards to existing values. He goes along with the status quo of the day, one that is shockingly 
similar to the one Nietzsche decried 100 years ago.  
                                                     
9 The difference between oppressive and voluntary authority are explored in the notion of liberal eugenics by 
Sloterdijk, Habermas, and Sorgner. It is also important to note that neither More nor Bostrom acknowledges the 
need for nor the possibility of a genetic breeding program under the auspices of transhumanism. 
10 Cf. TSZ 10, “Who wants to rule anymore? Who wants to obey anymore? Both are too burdensome.” Analyzed in 
greater detail in Chapter 3.  
11 Cf. Berkowitz, 2007 
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Despite this, More returns transhumanism to Nietzsche when he rejects the ideal and the 
utopian. “Extropians avoid utopian plans for ‘the perfect society’… In place of the static 
perfection of a utopia, we prefer an “extropia”—simply an open, evolving framework” Too often 
Kurzweil tries to sell you paradise. This is all too similar to the Christian image of heaven that 
Nietzsche despised. He thought that the valuing of an ideal, post-world left the imperfect, 
changing world of semblance meaningless. The transhumanist sales technique often imagines the 
perfect, immortal human inhabiting the perfect, technological world. The singularity in 
particular, is an image of perfect coherence between man and machine without conflict. It is a 
unification. Nietzsche loved strife and conflict over perfection. By stating clearly that utopia is 
not in the dreams of his transhumanism, More describes a system that might change according to 
the will of its inhabitants. He imagines a more Nietzschean futurescape than Kurzweil. 
It is easy to target More because he is not a dedicated academic, but it is difficult to 
separate his extropian transhumanism from Nietzsche because he tries so explicitly to bring the 
two into alignment. Still, I have noticed a few disparities in both his philosophy and his practice. 
His philosophy expresses the same unNietzschean principles that other transhumanists avow. 
First, he wants to extend the human life. Second, he maintains that a system of equality is 
possible and desirable in a posthuman world and our reaching towards it. I will structure chapter 
2 around a reading of Nietzsche that absolutely disavows these principles. In addition, his 
cryonics business shows a great disdain for the human body in that it imagines the self to be 
located exclusively in the brain12. Zarathustra argues against this directly when he associates the 
entirety of the body with the self. He wishes death on those who show disdain for the body. I 
                                                     
12 More himself has opted to only preserve his brain, per video cited above. 
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imagine More would not particularly like that, but I bet there is an icebox ready and waiting for 
him.  
 
Nick Bostrom 
Nick Bostrom is a professor at Oxford University and the founding director of the Future 
of Humanity Institute. He studies the political and philosophical impacts of technology. He is the 
academic darling of the transhumanist facebook group I joined when I began this project. His 
work regularly argues for the importance of transhuman technological research and the ethical 
viability of increasing our technological dominance over the Earth and modifying the human 
body. As my placement of his work suggests, I consider him to be both a transhumanist in his 
own right and an academic who studies transhumanism. Unique among the transhumanists, he 
acknowledges two distinctions between his transhumanism and Nietzsche.  
The first is the manner in which the overman is brought about. “What Nietzsche had in 
mind, however, was not technological transformation but a kind of soaring personal growth and 
cultural refinement in exceptional individuals13” (Bostrom 1, 4). Bostrom reads the creation of 
the overman as the cultural elevation of a selected few. This is very evident in Beyond Good and 
Evil, but I also read it as an evolutionary step through Zarathustra’s prologue. The creation of a 
new species from out of man is much more akin to the transhumanist project. Due to Nietzsche’s 
appreciation of science as art, it is not unreasonable to imagine that technological modifications 
of the body would form a part of our path to the overman. Babette Babich walks the line between 
Nietzsche’s call for both spiritual and corporeal upliftment beautifully. “Thus we overcome both 
                                                     
13 He continues, “(who he thought would have to overcome the life-sapping “slave-morality” of Christianity).” 
Nietzsche finds the slave morality of Christianity to be the origin of the value of equality in The Antichrist 43. I 
carry out this analysis in Chapter 3. The value of equality is maintained in Bostrom and More’s tablets of 
transhumanists values. 
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body and soul” (Tuncel, 124). The soul dictates the spiritual refinement and the cultural values 
of the individual. Both the body and the values of the individual are transformed in the overman. 
Thus the values of the culture of overmen are inherently different from our human values. In that 
the transhumanists focus their technological development on the enhancement of the body, they 
neglect the soul and the need for cultural transformation. While they call for the recreation of 
values, and even write new tablets in a very Zarathustran manner, the values they propose are 
shockingly similar to the human ones we hold today. In fact, I will argue that the culture they 
propose in the posthuman world is all too similar to our present values, significantly in 
perpetuating the slave morality of equality. While I would argue that the mission of enhancing 
the body, excepting the prolongation of human life, is shared by Nietzsche and transhumanism. 
Bostrom founds his second distinction on the transhumanists’ maintenance of the value of 
equality, as I do. In A History of Transhumanist Thought, Bostrom finds, “Despite some surface 
level similarities with the Nietzschean vision, transhumanism…Enlightenment roots, its 
emphasis on individual liberties, and its humanistic concern for the welfare of all humans” 
(Bostrom 1, 4). He disavows Nietzsche’s connection to transhumanism on the basis of 
conflicting values. He calls on other influences like the Enlightenment and the humanism and 
liberalism that spawned from it. Each of these systems are viciously critiqued by Nietzsche. 
Today they are criticized for hypocrisy and a selective definition of the rights-bearing human. 
The same states that adopted the values of freedom and equality simultaneously carried out 
extensive and exploitative colonialist projects. Nietzsche critiques them on very different 
grounds. For him, they are a covert extension of Christianity. They perpetuate the morals that 
deny life and the constant change of the Earth. They reach towards the infinite and degrade the 
only world we have to live on, this one. (AC, 43). Insofar as transhumanism hopes to persist in 
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these morals, they maintain old values that Nietzsche despised. I very much agree with Bostrom 
that the values of transhumanism, specifically their devout adherence to equality, are not 
compatible with Nietzsche’s politics. The cultural transformation he desires is not separate from 
the creation of the overman. Zarathustra works to destroy the same tablets in an effort to prepare 
the world for the overman. Perpetuating the principle of equality is no way to fulfill Zarathustra’s 
prophecy. 
 Bostrom has also tried his hand at creating a tablet of transhumanist values. 
Unsurprisingly, he advocates for equality under the heading “Wide Access.” It bears many 
similarities to More’s offering of an Open Society, but it is significantly less favorable to 
capitalism. Instead of lauding free exchange, Bostrom calls out structural inequality. Without 
offering any concrete ways that transhumanism might reach a broad swath of people, he 
expresses the need for such technological development to not increase inequality. “It would be 
sub-optimal if the opportunity to become posthuman were restricted to a tiny elite” (Bostrom 2, 
8)14. The charge of inequality has been levied against transhumanism frequently. It has 
consistently been refuted. In a world where upgrades to physical strength and intellectual 
capacity can be bought and sold—the world that the transhumanists look forward to—it is a bit 
terrifying to think of the corporeal, ‘innate’ advantages the rich could gain over the poor. 
Kurzweil consistently argues that rapid technological expansion will not increase global 
inequality, while others express deep concern. Still, transhumanists consistently pay lip service 
to equality.  
What is important to me in Bostrom’s desire, and Kurzweil’s argument, that 
transhumanism will not increase inequality, is that they advocate for the value of equality. They 
                                                     
14 Cf. My chapter 3. Nietzsche loves the tiny elite. 
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not only laud it in this world, they claim it as a value of their posthuman fantasies. Nietzsche 
despises the value of equality. He finds it to be Christian in its origin and directly opposed to a 
natural political landscape, which inherently forms divisions of rank and hierarchy. It is these 
very ranks that allow the refinement of the highest men. Furthermore, Zarathustra’s project of 
bringing about the overman is undertaken in part as the destruction of old values and the creation 
of new ones. Equality was a too old a value in Nietzsche’s time and it has only gotten older. 
Even if equality were not a value that Nietzsche found particularly hideous, he would not 
recommend its maintenance in the world of the overman nor in the project of preparing this 
world for the overman.  
Bostrom touches on another point critical to my argument without making a clear 
determination. I will argue that Nietzsche does not intend for humans to transform themselves 
into the overman, but only to become “forefathers of the overman” (TSZ, 65). The question 
becomes: can one individual pass from the base human state into the higher state of the 
overman? If we conceive of this passage as the transition from one species to another, as it 
appears in the opening lines of Zarathustra’s prologue15, then the answer is clear. No animal has 
ever transitioned from one species to another. At best, through the accumulation of a few 
mutations one can be closer to the aspects of the next species. One particularly mutated 
individual might “give birth to a dancing star,” or birth the overman, but one cannot break the 
species barrier themselves (TSZ, 9). Thus one can be transhuman and maybe posthuman, but 
never overman, if they were ever human. Bostrom makes no definitive determination on the 
possibility of transition, but he shows an openness to it. “if the posthuman being originated from 
a human being” (Bostrom, 6). Bostrom does not promise that you can become posthuman, but he 
                                                     
15 TSZ, 5, 6 This section is repeatedly quoted by the transhumanists as evidence of Nietzsche’s support for their 
project.  
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does conceive it as a possibility. Zarathustra never opens this possibility to humans. He only asks 
them to prepare the earth for the coming of the overman, to live towards the meaning of the 
earth, and never to make the transition themselves. But Bostrom is alone in failing to promise 
you fantastically new technological capacities. Other transhumanists do preach a message of 
personal transformation into the ideal posthuman. Kurzweil promises that you yourself can 
become a dancing star if you are not too old already. De Grey promises you passage to the other 
side so long as you invest in his anti-aging serum, and More, perhaps the least attractive, asks 
you to freeze yourself until we can just get the science right (But of course you won’t be dead!). I 
am not particularly surprised that you have to pay all of these people to ferry you to the 
posthuman world. Bostrom, with his Oxford salary, is the only one comfortable enough not to 
ask for tithes. Without a need to beg, he has no need to promise the personal salvation of your 
soul.  
I would make a brief point that among Bostrom’s tablet, and as advocated by every single 
transhumanist, is support for the extension of the human lifespan. This is one of my two main 
distinctions between Zarathustra’s preaching of the overman and the transhumanist message of 
the posthuman. Zarathustra tells you that man “lives too long” and needs to die at the right time, 
while the transhumanists want to extend your lifespan, ultimately in order to turn you yourself 
into the posthuman. I cannot say that Bostrom makes this error, because he is the only 
transhumanist who recognizes that Nietzsche is not an appropriate forefather to their mission. 
But he shares the valuing of a long life that Zarathustra derided. Others are much more distant 
from Nietzsche than even the Nietzsche denier. Aubrey de Grey goes so far as to promise 
immortality. 
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Aubrey de Grey 
 Aubrey de Grey is a biogerontologist. This means that he studies the effects and 
mitigation of biological aging. He is the Chief Science Officer of the SENS Research 
Foundation. It is dedicated to the attempt to end aging, first in mice and then in humans. Do not 
be fooled by the fact that he looks like Zarathustra, he does not promise the overman.16 De Grey 
promises immortality, in a roundabout way. Technically, he promises to extend the length of 
your vitality indefinitely. And he needs your donations to get it done! His book spends at least 20 
pages begging for your political and financial support. Write your congressman and donate to my 
foundation, if you don’t want you or your loved ones to die a slow, painful death. 
 De Grey understand aging as the steady increase of damage within your body. 
Hypothetically, he can repair this damage through gene therapies I do not understand17. The 
manner in which de Grey hopes to make humans immortal is called the Longevity Escape 
Velocity. “there is a threshold rate of biomedical progress that will allow us to stave off aging 
indefinitely” (de Grey, 330). He claims that he can extend your life indefinitely by putting you 
on a hamster wheel of rejuvenation therapies. If he can extend your life by 20 years by repairing 
a given amount of damage, then in that 20 years anti-aging processes will have progressed to the 
point that they can repair both the since accumulated damage and a bit they could not manage 
before, thus giving you another 20 or 30 years, and so on until infinity. I think this is a great 
business model because it not only requires return customers but constant research funding. 
Similar to the aeronautic escape velocity, given a certain speed, of technological development in 
this case, one can supersede the limit entirely. Age related death would never visit you, so long 
                                                     
16 Insofar as he looks like Rasputin. See the cover art for Oxford World Classics Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2005. 
17 Estep et al. 2006 also do not understand de Grey’s work. They strongly question his legitimacy. They title their 
refutation, Life Extension Pseudoscience and the SENS Plan. 
https://www2.technologyreview.com/sens/docs/estepetal.pdf 
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as the research never reaches a financial or technological limit and you return periodically for 
cell rejuvenation.  
De Grey calls on the “history of technology” to argue that technological progress 
consistently reaches a particular inflexion point (de Grey, 331). Before the base invention is 
made, progress is slow and difficult, after developments accelerate at a rapid pace. His main 
example, in keeping with the theme of escape velocity, is flight. Before Kitty Hawk, hundreds of 
years were spent attempting organized flight, while the “first supersonic airliner (Concorde)” 
flies a mere sixty years later (de Grey, 328). This seems like a modification of Moore’s Law, the 
proposition that the number of transistors on chips will double every two years. Some have 
expanded this into the general rule that technology increases exponentially. De Grey modifies 
this only in that he establishes an origin point at a particular invention. He claims that we have 
not yet reached that point in the fight against aging, but it will come when he can extend the life 
of a mouse by 2-3 years. After this point, he expects anti-aging technology to develop at a rapid, 
even exponential, rate, thus staving off age-related death forever18. He elaborates on this 
argument with a metaphor that sounds curiously Zarathustran. He moves from the believable 
history of airflight to the unwieldy future of jetpacks. “consider the analogy with literal escape 
velocity, i.e. the overcoming of gravity” (de Grey, 331). You jump off a cliff with a jetpack on. 
As you fall you steadily increase the power, slowing your fall and eventually “start shooting 
upward” (de Grey, 331). You have overcome gravity, for a moment, but have you overcome the 
spirit of gravity? The spirit of gravity is one of Zarathustra’s most significant overcomings, but it 
is not the same as simple gravity.  
                                                     
18 Babich has mocked Kurzweil for making the same claim about other transhumanist developments and the coming 
of the singularity. “taking Moore’s Law not as a statistical generalization thus far and as applied to chips but as if it 
were a cosmic law of nature applicable to everything technological” (Tuncel, 124). I am not qualified to determine 
the truth of the proposition that technology increases exponentially, but it is a truism I have heard for years. 
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The chapter “On the Spirit of Gravity” begins with the metaphor of the heaviness of earth 
and the flight of the bird escaping its pull, but the second part transitions into a reading of the 
metaphor as the heaviness of nihilism and the flight of “learning to love oneself” (TSZ, 154). 
“Heavy do earth and life seem to him; and the spirit of gravity wants it so! But whoever wants to 
become light and a bird must love himself—thus I teach” (TSZ, 154). Zarathustra’s spirit of 
gravity is the weight of the unvalued world. To one who wants to escape into the infinites of 
heaven or Plato’s world of ideas, the world is a terrible burden. It drags down his yearning soul 
and brings great depression and apathy. As the world is without value and all values are detached 
from the world, so all values become meaningless. To love oneself is to love the imperfect and 
the everchanging. It is to love the Earth and the body and the new meaning of the Earth, the 
overman. Both Nietzsche and de Grey use the metaphor of overcoming gravity, but they 
represent very different things. De Grey’s metaphor calls us away from the momentary and into 
the infinity of immortality. Nietzsche, paradoxically, implores us to return to the valuing of the 
Earth. One should learn to love oneself, but not into the infinite. A love for oneself is a love for 
becoming and overcoming, but each of these finds their meaning in the limits imposed by the 
Earth. If gravity is a law that denies life, then we will write a new one, but even that one will not 
live forever. Each law is to be loved for its overcoming and its ability to be overcome. Each body 
is to be loved for its life and its death, when that death is towards the goal of the overman. De 
Grey reaches towards the infinite and so he conceives of the limit, death, as a burden. The secret 
to overcoming the spirit of gravity is learning to love its effect on you. You must learn to love 
yourself as pinned beneath the limit and thus overcome it in spirit. You must not reach towards 
the infinite lest every limit, and death most of all, becomes a burden that drags you into nihilism. 
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Every transhumanist advocates for the extension of the human life, but only Aubrey de 
Grey promises immortality. I will argue that life extension alone is not a practice that Nietzsche 
thought would lead to the overman. Immortality, though, is absolutely not Nietzschean. 
Immortality through transformation is the promise of Christ. The immortality of the idea, and 
your access to it through transformation in your journey out of the cave, is the promise of Plato’s 
Socrates. Nietzsche despised both. They were the greatest ills of history and the source of his 
need to make of life change, becoming, and semblance. It would be all too easy to hold de Grey 
up as exemplary of all transhumanism and discard them as idealists and neo-Christians who 
reach for the infinite, but it would also be disingenuous. Further, it is a bit slippery to target de 
Grey at all because he does not speak of Nietzsche as influence, kindred spirit, surface level 
similarity, or even at all. De Grey is not, though, disavowed by other transhumanists as he has 
been by others in the biological gerontology community. He is invited to their conferences and 
quoted in their texts. A more moderate form of his fantastical promise, life extension, is a key 
part of their doctrine. Life extension alone is refuted several times in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
most significantly in the metaphor of the tightrope walker and the chapter “On Free Death.” I 
bring de Grey into the conversation as the extreme of a widely held norm—an anti-Nietzschean 
position on an already unNietzschean principle. The transhumanist mission of life extension 
separates transhumanism from Nietzsche’s philosophy and the posthuman from the overman.  
In my exploration of transhumanism, I have tried to expose a few ancillary distinctions 
between their work and Nietzsche’s. Ray Kurzweil lacks an understanding of the cultural 
overcoming that is crucial for Heidegger’s will to power. Max More locates the soul in the brain. 
He believes we can discard the body and still preserve the self, while Nietzsche identifies the 
soul and the self with the body. Both Nick Bostrom and Max More maintain the value of 
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equality, which Nietzsche both detested and thought had no place in the striving for a higher 
man. Aubrey de Grey’s policy of immortality reaches beyond the flux of the earth and into the 
infinite. If it falls short, then it lands only on life extension, which Nietzsche also derided. All of 
these are significant differences, but I rest the bulk of my argument only on the two clearest 
disparities: the extension of the human life and the value of equality.  
 
 
 
Downgoing: Dying Towards a Goal 
 
 This chapter argues that the extension of the human life is not an appropriate method for 
bringing about the overman. I read in the fall of the tightrope walker, which comes about by his 
being surpassed, a metaphor for the appropriate human living towards the overman. Man should 
“live dangerously” and perish, so that another can travel a bit further along the rope (GS, 283). I 
understand Zarathustra’s call to “Die at the right time!” as maintaining the purpose of death in 
species evolution (TSZ, 53). One grows withered and old, unfit for striving, not only in the 
weakness of old bones but also in one’s steadfast adherence to old values. The perilous rope 
dance from man to overman is a generational overcoming. No individual can make the entire 
crossing. This is violently opposed to Kurzweil’s promise that you can witness the singularity 
and de Grey’s efforts to extend the human life to infinity.  
  
The Fall of the Tightrope Walker 
“But you could well create the overman. Not you yourselves perhaps, my brothers! But you 
could recreate yourselves into fathers and forefathers of the overman: and this shall be your best 
creating! —” (TSZ, 65) 
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Not you yourselves—Recreate yourselves into forefathers. Forefathers of the overman—
Not you yourselves. This is the crucial difference between Nietzsche’s overman and 
transhumanist vision of the posthuman singularity. By extending the length of your life and the 
breadth of your capacities19, the transhumanists offer to turn you yourself into the next species 
that surpasses man. As though any single individual could transition from one species to the 
next. Nietzsche, on the other hand, asks you to live your all too human life in such a way that one 
day long after you are gone the overman might come about. The promise of personal, eternal life, 
the promise of personal self-transformation, is the promise of Christ, scorned by Nietzsche. It is 
also the promise of Plato’s escape from the cave—that you yourself might emerge from darkness 
into the light and be transformed. Nietzsche asks you to modify the way you live on earth with 
your eyes toward a goal, but he never promises you eternal paradise. Crucial to being a forefather 
of the overman is your own death. You can only progress so far along the rope between man and 
overman. Others will emerge who are better. They can reach closer to the goal. If you remain 
past the point at which you are the best, you only take up space. You must die. Not only to clear 
space for the overman, but also to clear space for the next man who will draw the species that 
much closer to the other side. You cannot make the crossing alone. You cannot make the 
crossing at all. Just as early humans ate and fucked the Neanderthals into nonexistence, so will 
the overman do the same to us. No Neanderthal ever became human. At best his seed was 
incorporated into our species only to embarrass you in your 23&me report (Only 2% caveman!). 
So too, you will never be the overman. No human will ever become overman. The overman, if he 
                                                     
19 One of these things is not like the other. The latter aligns with Zarathustra’s vision of the overman. I will argue 
that the former does not. 
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ever comes, is a rare mutation born from the best of us. He is entirely unhuman. At best, you can 
be his forefather, you can live in such a way as to hasten his coming. 
The prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra consists of two parts: Zarathustra’s descent from 
his mountain cave and his first speech to the public. His descent recalls Moses’ return from Mt. 
Sinai carrying the new tablets of his faith or the opening line of Plato’s Republic, “Socrates: I 
came down from the Piraeus.” Zarathustra descends to teach a new lesson and a new set of 
values. As Moses returns to find the Israelites worshipping the golden calf so does Zarathustra 
find the people worshipping a false idol. They have come to the marketplace to see the tightrope 
walker. Zarathustra wants to focus them instead on the unseen end of his perilous walk, the 
overman. “Mankind is a rope fastened between animal and overman—a rope over an abyss” 
(TSZ, 7). When More and Kurzweil cite this line, they do so without context. They claim only 
that Nietzsche affirms an evolutionary step beyond man. They are not wrong in this, but they 
neglect that no human will ever reach this end. Each human, if they live dangerously in pursuit 
of the goal of the overman, will try and fail like the tightrope walker. In trying, they will strive 
for self-overcoming and even the ultimate overcoming of their species. In failing, they will die 
and allow the one who surpasses them to travel a bit further. This is stated directly by Zarathustra 
and portrayed metaphorically in the tightrope walker’s fall from the line when he is surpassed by 
another. The overman is brought about precisely through the churning of generations, the birth 
and death of many individual men. In the following, I will provide this missing context. I will 
argue that it is crucial that man’s life not be extended in pursuit of the overman, but that man live 
dangerously and perish so that something better may take his place. In pursuit of a species 
beyond man, from out of man, the transhumanists follow Nietzsche’s vision of the overman. 
However, in making the extension of the human life a principle and method of this pursuit, they 
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neglect that the death of individual humans is a necessary step in the generational production of 
the overman. 
 It will be helpful to trace the action of the scene in relation to Zarathustra’s speeches. The 
two are intertwined. The crowd and the acrobat respond to Zarathustra, and he adjusts his 
rhetoric in order to respond to them. I offer a reading in which the tightrope walker’s fate serves 
as a metaphor for the human pursuit of the overman. I am not alone in this. Laurence Lampert 
reads a similar interaction between action and content. He divides Zarathustra’s first speech into 
three parts. Each describes a different image of the overman and employs a different tactic of 
persuasion. Each also corresponds to movement by the tightrope walker. All of Zarathustra’s 
efforts to persuade the crowd fail. They consistently misunderstand and mock him. It is simply 
not easy for man to understand the overman—to understand something that is entirely beyond 
himself. The same is true today.  
 Zarathustra’s first speech begins before the tightrope walker emerges onto the rope. His 
first words to the public read, “I teach you the overman. Human being is something that must be 
overcome. What have you done to overcome him?” (TSZ, 5). The overman is the product of the 
overcoming of man. It is presented as both a teaching and a challenge. The overcoming of man is 
insisted upon. It is a statement against contentment, passivity, and self-satisfaction. It expresses 
disgust with the belief that you, as human, are the fulfillment of everything that has come before 
you, rather than a small step along the way. You are confronted on your efforts to overcome the 
species, but the manner in which this overcoming is to be done is not yet clear. Sloterdijk reads it 
as a matter of programmatic breeding, I read it as a political system of inequality that improves 
the upper class, but Zarathustra first lays the values groundwork of his mission. “I beseech you, 
my brothers, remain faithful to the earth and do not believe those who speak to you of 
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extraterrestrial hopes” (TSZ, 6). This is a statement directly against Socrates and by extension 
Christ. Metaphysics thus far has privileged the ideal, the immortal, and the infinite truth. 
Socrates and Christ, in their promise of a world beyond, scorned the temporary, fractured, and 
imperfect earth. Zarathustra calls us to reject the false hope of the infinite. He calls us to value 
that which is imperfect and does not last forever. This is a part of the genesis of the overman. A 
valuing of the temporary earth and a rejection of the infinite and ideal. The promise of immortal 
life is both the promise of transhumanism and the promise of Christ. It is a lie that Nietzsche 
despises for its degradation of the earth.  “Once the soul gazed contemptuously at the body, and 
then such contempt was the highest thing: it wanted the body gaunt, ghastly, starved. Thus it 
intended to escape the body and the earth” (TSZ, 6). The valuing of the body is here tied to the 
valuing of the Earth and impermanence. At first glance, this seems to be in line with 
transhumanism. They speak of the enhancement and the health of the body. But Zarathustra’s 
valuing of the body is both a literal pronouncement and a metaphorical call to impermanence—to 
artistic creation on earth without resorting to the infinite. Transhumanism enhances the human 
body not with an eye towards constant recreation or the death of the human but rather towards 
perfection and immortality. Zarathustra loves the health of the body, but he demands that we not 
try to escape it in its inherent fragility and impermanence. This is very different from the 
transhumanist creed.  
 The crowd thinks Zarathustra has been hyping up the tightrope walker. They mistake the 
overman for the man who walks over them. He is not the overman. Zarathustra explains the 
metaphor: the rope is man, its beginning at animal, and its end at the overman. The tightrope 
walker is the man who lives dangerously, the man who makes his “vocation out of danger” (TSZ, 
12). He is not the overman, but he is the one who attempts the crossing. He represents the strong 
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human that tries, and necessarily fails, to make it to the overman. In this section of the prologue, 
the tightrope walker begins his performance. Zarathustra’s call to “herald” the overman plays on 
this beginning of the treacherous crossing. Both Zarathustra and the tightrope walker act as 
heralds. The herald foretells a great coming, but he is not the prophesied in himself. Zarathustra 
too does not claim to be overman in himself, and the tightrope walker will never reach his 
desired end. He will “perish” in the crossing as man must in his reaching for the overman (TSZ, 
9). The striving for the overman is not intended to reach its completion. Zarathustra calls on man 
to foresee and foretell the overman. He calls on us to reach for the end without any promise of 
heavenly satisfaction or infinite reward. This is the separation between Zarathustra’s call and the 
Christian promise of heaven. It is also the distinction between the overman and de Grey’s 
promise of immortal perfection. You will never reach the end of the rope, but you must still 
strive for it and perish along the way. 
This passage is of the utmost significance to disputing transhumanism’s false attachment 
to Nietzsche. They offer to turn you yourself into the immortal, ideal posthuman. The overman is 
not something any human will ever reach. It is brought about precisely through the death of the 
human and the death of many strong humans who prepare the world for the overman. “what is 
lovable about human beings is that they are a crossing over and a going under” (TSZ, 7).  It is 
true that man must try to cross over into the overman, but in that crossing he brings about his 
own downfall, as an individual and as a species. In crossing over, humans and human must go 
under. The crossing over is promised by Christ and transhumanists who promise your own 
transformation into the posthuman, but going under is the qualification that demands you 
recognize your own inadequacy. Two quotes from this passage emphasize the going under of 
man and the need for individual humans to bring their own downgoing in pursuit of the overman. 
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Note that Zarathustra’s teaching of downgoing or perishing is incompatible with any doctrine of 
human immortality. “I love the one who makes of his virtue his desire and his doom: thus for the 
sake of his virtue he wants to live on and to live no more” (TSZ, 8). To live on and to live no 
more is a contradictory construction. It is both immortality and mortality, both desire and doom. 
It is impossible to choose a privileged term in this opposition. Neither truly is. They are 
concomitant. If one maps this opposition onto the opening of this section, one’s desire becomes 
the crossing over and doom the going under. Man lives on in that he brings about something 
better, the overman, but he lives no more, he is doomed, in that man perishes in this bringing 
about. Man is only immortal in the product of his own mortality. This is as true in the hopes of 
childbearing as it is in the Nietzschean production of the overman. In perishing, he allows an 
improvement on his form to flourish. Transhumanism misses this need for the doom of man. 
They offer immortality to those who are still all too human. Zarathustra calls on man and men to 
die and live forever only in the ultimate genesis of a better overman. In striving for a better man, 
transhumanists are in line with Nietzsche, but in offering that to man as he is now, they ignore 
the generational, evolutionary production of the overman. They hope to extend man through the 
species barrier, in the remnants of old values and individual, human lives. The overman is 
brought about through both the striving for better life and the engine of death!  
The need for the human to perish in the birth of the overman becomes clearer. “I love the 
one who justifies the people of the future and redeems those of the past: for he wants to perish of 
those in the present” (TSZ, 8). In this quote, the people of the future, the overman, are set 
entirely distinct from those of the present and the past. We in the present are not told to become 
our hopes for the future, but only to justify them. We justify them in living towards them as a 
goal and in acknowledging that we are not fit to become them. We must perish in order to 
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prepare space for those who come after us, better men and overman alike. Those transhumanists 
who call for an end to aging, most notably de Grey, ask us to remain past our expiration date. 
They ask us to extend our lives and maintain our presence on Earth. They ask for a change in 
capacity, but they suggest the maintenance of a constant: you and your life. Is it any surprise that 
this plays directly on your fear of death and decrepitude? Zarathustra implores you to accept this 
death as necessary in pursuit of a goal. Transhumanists do not offer the production of a new, 
improved species that comes at the cost of your own death and the death of your loved ones as 
Zarathustra does. They offer abatement from your fears and contentment with yourself. They tell 
you that you can be the “ebb of this great flood” of constant species improvement that every 
animal has engaged in out of their own will to power (TSZ, 5). Zarathustra asks you to face your 
doom and have contempt for yourself (TSZ, 6). Zarathustra never offers that you yourself can 
become the perfect overman, as the transhumanists do with the posthuman, in their promises of 
eternal immortality and physical perfection. Instead, he calls on you to be the herald of the 
overman. “they herald the coming of the lightning, and as heralds they perish” (TSZ, 9). As 
Sloterdijk puts it, Nietzsche thinks of the overman in “an era of the world far in the future” 
(Sloterdijk, 22). More than a long way off, the overman is only possible given your death and the 
death of man. This plays out in both the fate of the tightrope walker and the speeches of 
Zarathustra. The next man cannot travel further along the rope if you clog it up. You must fall for 
others to progress. At best, you can hope to herald the overman, to prepare the way for the 
overman, and to live in such a way that you might be the forefather of the overman.  
Zarathustra’s call for the death of man to provide the way for overman is misunderstood 
by the crowd. “I am not the mouth for these ears” (TSZ, 9). Zarathustra’s teachings are just as 
fundamentally misunderstood today by the transhumanists if they believe they can become 
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overman within their lifetime, however long it may be extended. In Lampert’s words, Z moves 
from his “description of a future goal” to an attempt to shame the crowd into hearing his 
teachings (Lampert, 18 emphasis mine). He begins to speak of the “last human being” (TSZ, 9). 
According to Lampert, this is an alternative, and much worse, destiny of man, not a precursor to 
the overman, “the victory of the last man would preclude the coming of the superman” (Lampert, 
24)20. Man is currently progressing towards this dreaded last man. He offers the overman as an 
alternative, but one that will require an immense effort of will and preparation. The last man 
blinks at this prospect. He is self-satisfied and feels no need for improvement. He thinks he has 
already reached the ideal. “The time of the most contemptible human is coming, the one who can 
no longer have contempt for himself” (TSZ, 9). Contempt for yourself brings with it the yearning 
for a better man, an overman. It is the willingness to herald your own doom in pursuit of the 
other shore. It is the desire paired with doom. The last man has no desire and definitely no desire 
for his own doom. There is no chaos or yearning in him. He thinks himself perfect already. Isn’t 
this more akin to the posthuman that transhumanists speak of? Their new species is not brought 
about through death and striving, or the recreation of values and a new conception of time. It is 
brought about through the extension of the human into infinity, in both his individual personality 
and his old values. They continue to hold the old value of equality dear, and personal longevity, 
as the mask of the fear of death, is at the heart of their project. The last man loves both his own 
longevity and passive equality. “like the flea beetle; the last human being lives longest” (TSZ, 
10). The last man is a pest that cannot be eradicated. He lives on and on never giving way to 
                                                     
20 I very much agree. “It is time that mankind set themselves a goal. It is time that mankind plant the seed of their 
highest hope. Their soil is still rich enough for this. But one day this soil will be poor and tame, and no tall tree will 
be able to grow from it anymore” (TSZ, 9). My assertion that only the death of man will lead to the birth of the 
overman risks suggesting that the “last man” would be a necessary step in this process. But my model for human 
death, as Zarathustra’s, is the tightrope walker who lives dangerously and risks all in trying to make his crossing—
only to fall into the abyss. The last man is an image of contentment and passivity. He is the crowd. I will even argue 
that he is an image of the transhuman posthuman.  
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something better. He clogs the rope indefinitely. The species improvement that Zarathustra calls 
for cannot take place within a single individual who remains across time. It demands death and 
rebirth. Zarathustra calls on the crowd to live dangerously and die—to fight to reach the other 
side and necessarily fall so that others can make it a bit further. In the figure of the last man, he 
shames those who want to remain in contentment and ease. The transhumanists offer permanent, 
placid contentment. They tell you that you are good enough to be in yourself the end of human 
evolution. They offer to turn you into the complacent last man who does not dream beyond 
himself, blinking. Like the last man, they honor equality21. “One no longer becomes poor and 
rich: both are too burdensome. Who wants to rule anymore? Who wants to obey anymore? Both 
are too burdensome” (TSZ, 10). In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche associates equality with a 
slave morality. The weak resent the strong. They try to hold them back through the morals of 
equality and humility. The overman, as the maximization of will to power, is a society of 
masters—a community in which each strives to dominate the others. The last man is content to 
make everyone a slave to no real master—a castrated bull with no yoke, content to chew the cud 
and plod the fields aimlessly. “No shepherd and one herd!” (TSZ, 10). This is the political vision 
of equality proffered by transhumanists like Bostrom and More. It is entirely un-Nietzschean. 
They offer the despised last man and shudder at the brutality and egoism of the overman. Like 
the last man, transhumanists value longevity, equality, complacency, and self-satisfaction. The 
transhumanist posthuman, or singularity, or precisely the vision of man that Zarathustra employs 
to shame us into action. The overman, unlike the posthuman, embraces danger and death in order 
                                                     
21 Their claim that the ability to purchase physical perfection and immortality will bring about equality is highly 
dubious. Kurzweil claims that technology drastically reduces in price after an initial surge. He loves the example of 
the smartphone. Babich tackles this well (Tuncel, 117). As soon as the old model depreciates, a new, more culturally 
desirable one is released at the same (or higher) initial price. Still, they claim equality as a part of their proposed 
future. Particularly Bostrom but also More. 
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to clear the way for the overman. The human cannot become the overman in himself, but he can 
become the last man and he can become posthuman, or he can will the overman in his own death.  
This vision of the last man marks the end of the prologue as the collection of 
Zarathustra’s initial speeches, but the action of the scene continues. The death of the man who 
lives dangerously, the tightrope walker, in his pursuit of the other side, the overman, 
metaphorically enacts Zarathustra’s teaching. In the scene, Zarathustra’s teachings continue to be 
tragically misunderstood. The crowd laughs at him. They find the image of the last man more 
favorable than the overman. “’Give us this last human being, oh Zarathustra’ – thus they cried – 
‘make us into these last human beings! Then we will make you a gift of the overman” (TSZ, 11). 
Lampert interprets this as an exchange. The crowd will accept the destiny of the last man and 
leave the overman to Zarathustra. In my understanding, the crowd misunderstands the sequence 
of the creation of the overman. They believe they can progress from man to last man and finally 
into overman, when in fact they are two opposing destinies of man. One of the universal slave 
morality of the last man, and the other of a new kind of will to power represented by the 
overman. If the transhumanists reach toward the overman at all, this is the manner of their quest. 
They will first turn man into last man so that he can become overman. In this process, though, 
they will ruin the soil that might grow a “tall tree” (TSZ, 9). They will deplete man of his chaos 
such that he can no longer “give birth to a dancing star” (TSZ, 9). Zarathustra calls us to reject 
the placid health and self-complacency of the last man in striving for the overman. The 
transhumanists call on us to strive for longevity and equality, thus precluding the possibility of a 
new, ranked birth from out of the death of man.  
The true genesis of the overman is revealed in metaphor by the fate of the tightrope 
walker. Man must live dangerously and die in order to turn himself into a forefather of the 
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overman. When the brave acrobat is midway across the rope, a jester22 emerges from the first 
tower. He rapidly catches up to the walker and begins to jeer at him. His mocking is focused on 
the tightrope walker’s inadequacy and the need for competition and generational improvement. 
“Forward, sloth, smuggler, pale face! Or I’ll tickle you with my heel! What business have you 
here between the towers? You belong in the tower, you should be locked away in the tower for 
you block the way for one who is better than you!” (TSZ, 11). Despite the tightrope walker’s 
practice and diligence, the one who comes immediately behind him is already surer of foot and 
more confident in his crossing. The jester urges him on toward the goal before questioning his 
business on the rope at all. We already know, and Zarathustra will affirm it in his death, that the 
tightrope walker is among the bravest of men. Unlike the crowd who gaze complacently, 
blinking, the tightrope walker strives to make the crossing to the other side, to the overman. Still, 
he is quickly surpassed. He “block[s] the way for one who is better” (TSZ, 11). It is the same 
with man in his pursuit of the overman. We must all obey our will to power, strive for self-
overcoming, and try to make the crossing, but soon someone better will come along. They will 
be able to make it a bit further towards the goal, and in doing so, they will have to pass us by. 
This passing is not a peaceful one. In the right pursuit of the overman, unlike the cunning 
survival of the weak in slave morality, the weak will perish and the strong will survive, until they 
too are bested by the next. We must die as we are passed—both because the next will knock us 
from our perch whether we like it or not, and because we will choose our own death out of a 
                                                     
22 His status as a jester is a curiosity. Lampert sees him as a cynical figure who mocks the heroic striving for the 
overman. His claim that the tightrope walker ought to remain in the tower, “in stasis,” suggests that he has no hope 
for the overman (Lampert, 28). In my telling, the jester represents the next man. His mocking displays the contempt 
each successive generation has for the last as man inches across the rope towards the overman. Because he can make 
it a bit further, what came before is useless. To me, his jesterhood is the playful and rude nature of youth. Later, 
Zarathustra states, “But only a jester thinks: ‘human being can also be leaped over” (TSZ, 159). I cast man not as the 
jester but as the tightrope walker. What is important to me in the jester is the inevitable fact of being surpassed. The 
rapid progress of leaping is not implied by my reading. 
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supreme desire for the goal of the overman. By lingering on the rope, continuing to strive when 
we are no longer the strongest and the best, we block the path for those who can bring man closer 
to overman. This is a fact of evolutionary progress. Birth and rare mutation are necessary to 
bring about change, but so is the death of the old and outdated. And so the tightrope walker dies 
as he is passed. “—he let out a yell like a devil and leaped over the man who was in his way. 
This man, seeing his rival triumph in this manner, lost his head and the rope. He threw away his 
pole and plunged into the depths” (TSZ, 11). We will all be leapt over. It comes as a shock. It 
marks the beginning of our end. A rival will emerge and surpass us. The best we can do at that 
moment, after we struggle and fail to assert our dominance, is to die and let the better travel as 
far as they can. They will be surpassed soon too. The striving for the overman is a procession of 
valiant attempts and necessary falls. No human makes it to the overman. Just as the tightrope 
walker’s journey ends tragically when the next man leaps over him, individual men must die so 
that the species can progress towards its own end, which is also its fulfillment, the creation of the 
overman. Zarathustra honors the tightrope walker in his necessary death. In a brief moment that 
might stand against Alcor’s assertion that the body can die without you dying along with it, 
Zarathustra says to the fallen man, “Your soul will be dead even sooner than your body — fear 
no more!” (TSZ, 11). The futuristic scam of cryonics relies oddly heavily on the archaic notion 
of the immortality of the soul—the persistence of your personality after the death of your body. 
Zarathustra commends a valiant and complete death from out of a perilous life. 
This is precisely what the transhumanists miss when they promise immortality. They 
forget that the human is not suited to become the overman. The overman is an entirely other 
species. Man is suited for striving, but that striving reaches a necessary limit. That limit occurs 
when the next generation emerges superior. If man lives forever, and we instead curb the 
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birthrate as de Grey hesitates to suggest, then we limit the possibility for the progressive, 
generational improvement of man. The old will clog the rope and prevent the young from 
moving past them. They offer to continuously improve you and your physical and mental 
capacities, but your deficiency, your contemptible humanity, is not only based in your 
limitations. It is also based in the limitations of your parents. If these can be overcome in the 
body, they cannot be so easily overcome in the values held in the mind (BGE, 264). Your values 
are a product of your origin that cannot be overcome with gene therapy. Humans are beholden to 
their human origin. Only those who are born as slightly better men can destroy old values and 
create new ones. The old are too ingrained in what the human was. We must perish so that the 
better can take our place. Not just the overman, but also the next man—the next generation who 
can make it a bit further. If man truly wants to bring about Zarathustra’s overman, he must strive 
to live dangerously and die so that others can journey a bit further. The transhumanist promise of 
immortality absolutely prevents the evolutionary, generational genesis of the overman. The 
posthuman is not the overman. He is the complacent, contemptible last man. 
 
On Free Death 
 The prologue is not the only place where Zarathustra affirms the need for the death of 
man in the genesis of the overman. “On Free Death” is a chapter usually taken to concern 
suicide, the free choosing of one’s death23. This is not wrong, but in this discussion we can also 
find the broader commandment: “Die at the right time!” (TSZ, 53) Suicide is the willing of one’s 
death, but one should also will one’s death even without the act itself, for the good of yourself 
                                                     
23 Karl Jaspers reads it in this way. Suicide turns death into an activity of life. Michael Hauskeller also calls on this 
chapter to argue against the transhumanist policy of life extension. See Tuncel, 34. He writes, “The overhuman 
understands how to live and how to die. The transhumanist, in Nietzsche’s view, understands neither” (35). Dying is 
central to the life of the overman. I argue that it is also key to the human living towards the overman. 
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and the good of the species. In Zarathustra’s teaching, one should die at the right time, when one 
is withered and no longer useful. The transhumanists seek to prevent withering as they extend the 
life, but they forget that the mind grows old along with the body. Even if it did not become 
slower and more confused, it would still become set in old values. You can’t teach an old dog 
new tricks, not even with bionic legs.  
 Zarathustra tells his followers that they must learn to die and die at the right time. 
Learning to die is not a new teaching. Ironically, given Nietzsche’s lambasting of Socrates in 
Beyond Good and Evil, it is also the lesson of The Apology. Zarathustra crucially adds the 
addendum: at the right time. When is this right time? When one has established for themselves 
“goal and heir” (TSZ, 54). The goal and heir of man is the overman. He is the goal at the end of 
the rope and heir by way of his generational production. The production of generations, the 
steady progression across the rope, occurs through birth and death. We are all too ready to laud 
the joy of birth, but Zarathustra laments, we have yet to turn death into a “festival” (TSZ, 53). 
Death, when it comes at the right time, is a joyous, cyclical, and necessary occurrence. It should 
be looked forward to and celebrated, not run from. “And out of reverence for his goal and heir he 
will no longer hang withered wreaths in the sanctuary of life” (TSZ, 54). It is out of our desire to 
bring about the overman that we must die. When we are withered, we can no longer progress 
along the rope and we must clear the way for others. The transhumanists claim that they will 
only prevent withering and extend vitality, but they forget that the creation of the overman is a 
generational process. One human cannot make it all the way to the overman. He must, like 
Zarathustra, pass the golden ball of his goal to an heir—who will pass it to the next and the next. 
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24Like the tightrope walker who falls from the rope when another surpasses him, the last 
generation must make room for the next. It is not always a peaceful process. The tightrope 
walker is killed by the rude jester, but if one knows when one’s time has come, and one respects 
both the final goal and the potential for the next to reach a bit closer to that goal, then one will 
clear space on the rope of their own volition. They will die freely at the right time. Zarathustra 
reinforces this claim in the following line. “Indeed, I do not want to be like the rope makers: they 
stretch out their threads and in doing so they always walk backwards” (TSZ, 540). The 
transhumanists are ropemakers. They hope to stretch the human life as long as possible. In doing 
so, they clog the bridge between man and overman. They extend the rope we walk on and make 
it a longer journey to the other side. They walk backwards. Their aim is not the overman, but the 
self-interest of the all-too-human individual. The dawn of the overman is the twilight of the 
human. By extending our life and our comfort, they drive us deeper down the way towards the 
complacent last man, blinking, and forget the danger, risk, and brevity of the tightrope walker. 
They prevent our progress towards the final goal by extending the life of humanity. This goal is 
the creation of our own heir, the overman, but it is also our own end.  
 Zarathustra calls for death at the right time as both a personal and species good. When 
you have lived too long, and begun to rot on the branch, you do yourself a disservice by 
continuing to cling to it, but you also harm the progression of the next generation by occupying 
space. Death at the right time must be freely chosen as the culmination of your own life and with 
the goal of species progression towards the overman in mind.  
Far too many live and far too long they hang on their branches. Would that a storm came 
to shake all this rot and worm-food from the tree! (TSZ, 54) 
 
                                                     
24 Lampert argues that Zarathustra’s refusal to die at the end of Book 1, having completed his initial teachings and 
passed the golden ball, is his failure to live as he preaches. It is for this that he apologizes. “More than anything I 
like to see you, my friends, throwing the golden ball! And so I linger yet a bit on earth: forgive me that!” (TSZ, 55).  
 45 
The human is compared to the fruit. If it is not picked when it is ripe, at the right time, then it 
rots on the branch. It becomes useless and sickly. “Far too many live and far too long” 
Zarathustra laments the mass quantity of humans and the length of their lives. He is concerned 
with the overpopulation of the Earth by the less than admirable human species, and one of its 
main causes, the dramatic extension of the human life25. Unlike Malthus, his concern with the 
quantity of humans is not tied to the amount of available resources. Zarathustra is concerned with 
vitality and evolutionary progression. The quantity of the population clogs the rope and prevents 
us from marching steadily, generationally, towards our goal and our end. The sickly and 
withered nature of humans in their final years is both physical and spiritual; he ties this withering 
to love and action as much as physical capacity. Why do so many cling to the branch for too long 
and hold on to their lives past their time? “It is cowardice that keeps them clinging to branch” 
(TSZ, 54). Zarathustra acknowledges that the plunge into the unknown is frightening. The 
comfort of life, however diminished, seems a universal good to fruit that knows nothing other 
than the branch, but he calls on us to be brave and live dangerously. He calls on us to risk the 
crossing and accept the fall when our time comes. The storm that comes to shake our rotten and 
withered fruit from the branches of life rings of a new plague or predator to come and feast on 
the weak—leaving only the strong and vital. But this would be an involuntary death. Zarathustra 
encourages death freely chosen. What is necessary is not some new danger in the world to 
winnow the human race. What is necessary is a shift in values such that life is good only when 
one drives the species towards the goal of the overman, and this goal is placed above all others. 
When the overman is forefront in the human mind, as our overgoing and downgoing, as goal and 
                                                     
25 Caleb E. Finch reports, “Since 1800, lifespans have doubled again” Nietzsche lived at a time when the European 
adult life expectancy was increasing by nearly a decade. Aubrey de Grey hopes to extend the lifespan to the point of 
infinity. 
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heir, as the new meaning of the Earth, then death becomes a necessary step in the achievement of 
that goal. Death becomes the downgoing of the individual that enables the overgoing of the 
human into the overman. Death becomes a bequeathing to the heir in pursuit of the goal. We 
cannot get to the overman alone, by the infinite extension of our lives and the supposedly infinite 
extension of our capacities, because the overman is not an individual mission. It is the goal and 
heir, the overgoing and downgoing, of the species. It is the creation of a new species from out of 
the ruins of the human. It is necessary that the human must die so that the overman can live, but 
it is also necessary that the individual human must die so that the next human can progress a bit 
further along the rope or throw the golden ball to the next human. The overman is brought about 
over time and generations. This is the distinction between the overman and the posthuman. They 
locate the species transformation within one body or one soul. This shows a dramatically 
different, and I think poor, understanding of evolution, while the creation of the overman 
requires the churning, the birth and death and birth and death of many generations of humans.  
 The change in values necessary to bring about the overman through numerous individual 
deaths and the ultimate death of the human must be brought about through new artists or new 
preachers. In Nietzsche’s understanding of the alteration of values, old ones are destroyed and 
new ones created by exceptional artists, those who bring out what shines from out of semblance 
or Schein.    
Would that preachers of quick death came! They would be the right storms and shakers of 
the trees of life for me! But I hear only preaching of the slow death and patience with all 
things “earthly” (TSZ, 54).  
 
Zarathustra yearns for the preachers of the quick death. This is the right method of individual 
death for Zarathustra. He does not encourage the creation of new diseases or predators such that 
our position of dominance over Earth would be reduced. He calls for a new value on life and 
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death to be taught by preachers and ingrained into the populace. Quick here refers to both the 
speed of death once it has begun and the length of a single lifetime. Once one has become truly 
rotten on the branch, it does not do you or the progression of the species any good to hang on 
through excessive medical treatments like breathing machines and feeding tubes. These are 
expensive and largely ineffective. The quality of life they provide is extremely low. 
Transhumanists agree. They claim that they will extend your vitality. Even if they succeed, 
Zarathustra would still say that it is better to die and clear the way for other fruit to grow ripe. 
The health of the tree is not the health of the fruit. The comfort of the fruit might be found in 
remaining on the branch as long as possible, but the health of the tree is in growing and shedding 
and growing again. This is the health of the species over the health of the individual. Your 
rottenness is not just the poor health of your body. It is also the old values you carry from your 
generation. When you hang on the branch too long, you stand against the wave of value change 
that Nietzsche loves to ride.  Zarathustra does not call for preachers of the slow death, preachers 
of hanging on to the branch like the transhumanists. He calls for preachers of the quick death. He 
calls on you to live fast and live dangerously—to push and exceed your limits, yes, but also to 
rise to meet your final limit so that the next man can overcome you and reach closer to the 
overman.  
 The impetus to freely choose your own death is not compatible with the transhumanist 
policy of life extension. Zarathustra laments the overlong life of current man. Our lifespans have 
only gotten longer since, but there is no indication that we have learned to live fully and 
dangerously as we ought to in pursuit of the overman. Nor is there any indication that 
transhuman upgrades would increase our life as Nietzsche means it—as a joyous, vibrant, painful 
affair. It seems to me that the increase in technological capacity and reliance will lead us further 
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into placid contentment. It will lead us further down the road toward the last man, blinking now 
on some mechanical retina but still blinking. It will surely lead us to rot on our branches, if not in 
health then in the remnants of old values that cannot be overcome by old minds. 
 
 
 
Equality / Nobility 
 
 Two intertwined issues are at play in understanding Nietzsche’s relationship to equality. 
First is his position on values and their transformation. Nietzsche takes issue with values that 
claim to be derived from the divine. He calls for the artistic creation of values from out of 
worldly material. Values should be constantly challenged by the creation of new art. The new 
creation destroys the old. In Nietzsche’s view, no value could ever be permanent or universal. 
They should be in constant flux, with the old and tired ever superseded by the new and shining. 
Equality was a tired value in Nietzsche’s eyes. It derived from the Christian valuing of each 
individual soul by the divine and not from the hierarchical, competitive nature of life. It was a 
value that he himself aimed to destroy and replace with a better artistic creation. This is the 
second matter. To Nietzsche, equality was also the product of a slave morality that aimed to 
restrict the strong and preserve the weak. He hoped to replace it with a master morality that 
allowed the strong to strive fully for the improvement of themselves and man. The master 
morality is the initial step towards the morality of the overman (Strong, 237). The master 
morality is established against the value of equality. When More and Bostrom maintain the value 
of equality in their tablets, they fail to align with Nietzsche on three counts. First, they embrace 
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an old value instead of challenging it with their own artistic creation. Second, they maintain a 
value that Nietzsche despised for its foundations in Christianity and a slave morality. Third and 
most importantly, Nietzsche identifies rigid inequality as the optimal political structure for 
surpassing man. In this chapter, I will first describe Nietzsche’s position on the transformation of 
values, which I draw largely from Heidegger’s reading. I will then consider Nietzsche’s specific 
condemnation of equality on the grounds of slave morality in Beyond Good and Evil and 
Christianity in The Antichrist. Both provide an image of overcoming man through inequality. 
 Heidegger defines the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophical project as an overcoming of the 
nihilism inspired by Platonism and Christianity. These idealistic systems reach for the divine and 
otherworldly in their search for the truth. In doing so, they devalue the earthly and leave us 
without meaningful values to interact with in our lives—they leave us in nihilism (AC, 43). They 
attempt to find and fix eternal, unchanging truths. But this is contrary to the perspectival nature 
of life. Humans develop particular perspectives based on their surroundings and interactions. 
Their personal truths change across time and through conflict with the perspective of another, 
altering both in the process. When the student of Socrates’ cave emerges into the light to find the 
true essence of things in the light of the Sun, he in fact only “petrif[ies]…any single given 
perspective” (Heidegger, 214). The truth found in the divine is neither eternal nor universal, it is 
the reification of a momentary, individual notion. The values of Christianity derive from these 
allegedly eternal truths. They deny and degrade the experience of life as mere semblance, an 
apparition disguising eternal truth. Nietzsche wants us to refocus and revalue Schein, or 
semblance. He loves the ever-changing becoming of life and the opportunities for revaluation 
that it provides. We must recognize truth as “always only an apparentness that has come to 
prevail,” and thereby recognize that any given truth or value can be overcome by a better one 
 50 
(Heidegger, 214). In the world of Schein, our relationship to truth and value cannot be that of 
reaching for and repositioning ourselves in relation to the Eternal. It must be a relation of will to 
power as art.  That is, Nietzsche calls on us to take the world of semblance as the only world, as 
reality itself, and to make of it a battleground of artistic creation and destruction. When we 
encounter a value or truth, we are to regard it as the art of another raised to prominence. It is the 
imperative of our being, the demand of our will to power, to challenge and overcome it. Any 
truth or value can be destroyed if another creation aligns more closely with life and outshines it 
in the perspective of a multitude. This is the manner of being in Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche. One should live in the real and only world. When confronted with a value or truth that 
limits us or does not align with our perspectives, we should destroy it and create a new value in 
its place.  
This is also the mission of Zarathustra as the transformer of values and the herald of the 
overman. “Here I sit and wait, old broken tablets around me and also new tablets only partially 
written upon” (TSZ, 156). Zarathustra himself breaks tablets, breaks the old values and tries to 
replace them with new artistic creations. He calls on others to do the same, “Yes my brothers, 
break, break me the old tablets” (TSZ, 162). As one of Zarathustra’s main teachings is the 
overman, so the destruction of old values and the creation of new ones must be an effort to 
prepare the Earth for the overman. More and Bostrom, too, express the need to recreate our 
values in light of the posthuman. And yet, their continued allegiance to the stale value of equality 
expresses something entirely different. The cling to an old, comfortable value that, according to 
Nietzsche, has held humans back from the true, competitive, ranked nature of life. In the same 
chapter cited above, “On Old and New Tablets,” Zarathustra proclaims, “my brothers, we need a 
new nobility, which is the adversary of all rabble and all despotic rule” (TSZ, 162). The 
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disavowal of equality forms one of Zarathustra’s half-written tablets. He yearns for the creation 
of a new elite to hold back the rise of a tyrant, and perhaps more importantly, the rule of the 
masses. What is the rule of the masses but equality and democracy? Zarathustra loves neither 
(Nor does he appear to love fascism, contrary to readers of the third reich). In calling for a new 
nobility, Zarathustra calls for hierarchy and rank in society. He does so in direct opposition to the 
value of equality. Lampert agrees that this new nobility forms Nietzsche’s proposed political 
system against the “two modern political extremes of tyranny and democracy” (Lampert, 206). 
He calls it a reformulation of aristocracy based not on bloodlines, but on the ability to guide the 
future and redeem the past, i.e. cultural knowledge and creative potential. The ability to first 
know and then destroy old values, and then finally to create new ones in their place. He makes 
no apologies for the clear elitism in Nietzsche’s message of aristocracy and nobility. Nor does he 
try to cast it as the problematic ramblings of only a half-finished tablet. It is clear to me already 
that Nietzsche is not in favor of equality, but it becomes explicit in Nietzsche’s critiques of 
equality in Beyond Good and Evil and The Antichrist.   
Before I elaborate on Nietzsche’s critiques of equality, I would like to discuss the 
transhumanist’s need to maintain the principle of equality in their mission. I believe it is not out 
of a moral imperative towards treating each man like an end in himself, nor out of a belief that 
God loves each individually and universally the same. I believe they maintain equality out of 
political necessity. Ironically enough, it is because their project lies so close to Nietzsche’s that 
they must break with him. Because the mission to develop a higher man immediately rings of a 
lived inequality between higher and lower, because the development of a higher man must 
necessarily leave some behind and who will be left behind is still at question, the transhumanists 
must avow equality in an effort to delay the obvious criticism. I would argue that equality is not 
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even compatible with their own project, and it absolutely violates Nietzsche’s. I do not buy 
Kurzweil’s story of the falling price of technology. Not everyone has a cellphone, as Babich 
reminds us. And even those who do cannot afford the latest model. When the latest model is a 
20% increase in intelligence, those who have will get jobs and those who have not will be 
shoveling shit. Already, how much better do students with laptops do in school, not to mention 
private tutors26. The accusation of inequality is the greatest peril for hawkers of transhumanism. 
They advocate for equality with such dedication from a defensive position, out of a slave 
morality if you will. It is natural to wonder, if the rich can buy physical and mental upgrades, 
won’t they dominate the poor even more than they do now? If we believe Lampert, then 
Nietzsche calls for precisely such a relationship of inequality between man and overman. The 
transhumanists maintenance of equality is incongruous with Nietzsche’s demand that we destroy 
all old values and create new ones from out of semblance. It further violates Zarathustra’s call 
for us to do the same in our living towards the overman. But it also violates Nietzsche’s specific 
hatred of the value of equality, and his mission to breed higher men from out of a system of 
inequality. 
 
What is noble? 
 
Part 9 of Beyond Good and Evil is entitled, “What is noble?” It is a call to nobility, to 
divisions of rank, and a rallying against equality in the mission of bettering man. Nietzsche 
begins with an unequivocal statement, “Every enhancement so far in the type “man” has been the 
work of an aristocratic society — and that is how it will be, again and again, since this sort of 
                                                     
26 As much as a .4 increase in GPA according to Gulek and Demirtas, Learning with Technology: The impact of 
Laptop Use on Student Achievement 2005 
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society believes in a long ladder of rank order and value distinctions between men, and in some 
sense needs slavery” (BGE, 151). I could not find it any clearer. Nietzsche believes that the 
enhancement of the type man, “the constant ‘self-overcoming of man’” is only possible in a 
society of profound inequality (BGE, 151). This constant self-overcoming of man is the very 
definition of a will to power that lives towards the overman. Man can be developed and 
surpassed in no other society than one that makes distinctions of value between different men 
and different types of men. Species improvement comes from the continuous raising of an elite 
to ever higher psychic and cultural levels, and this raising comes at the cost of treating those who 
are not elite as “tools, all for the sake of the aristocracy” (BGE 152). Man himself can be 
overcome only through the establishment of a nobility, and a nobility can only be established in 
opposition to the downtrodden workers. Nietzsche goes so far as to call for a need for slaves in 
the mission of improving man. All this in his book subtitled “Prelude to a Philosophy of the 
Future.” More and Bostrom have undertaken a similar project in their tablets of values, but 
among them they consistently include equality. Nietzsche’s is not a doctrine of equality. It is a 
doctrine of inequality, and it is also a doctrine of improving and surpassing man by the extension 
of that inequality. Unlike the transhumanists, Nietzsche recognizes the political consequences of 
his call to improve man. When they call for an equal society, while calling for the improvement 
of man through capitalist exchange, they dream. Nietzsche argues that the improvement of man 
comes first in the few at the cost of the many. His critique of equality itself is still harsher, but it 
follows from the same logic. It prevents the improvement of man by restricting the strong and 
uplifting the weak. It denies the essentially exploitative character of life.  
First, Nietzsche describes the value of equality as, “the will to negate life” (BGE, 153). 
This is because “life is precisely will to power” (BGE, 153). That is, life is inherently combative. 
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Every being, in its innate urge to grow, seeks to spread its power and win dominance over others. 
The value of equality denies this brutal fact of life. It asks the strong to limit their potential and 
live in harmony with the weak. It protects the weak from being absorbed into the development of 
the strong. Equality is acceptable to Nietzsche only when it is among individuals that have 
“genuinely similar quantities of force and measures of value, and belong together within a single 
body” (BGE, 152). Among members of the aristocracy, or the new nobility, for example, it 
makes sense for the strong to not challenge the similarly strong and those they form an alliance 
with. If equality is “held to be the fundamental principle of society,” as it is in many democratic 
nations and as it supposedly will be in the posthuman societies of the future, then it denies the 
dominative, violent essence of life and our necessary drive to grow and surpass limits.   
If equality is first and foremost a denial of the essential nature of life, then it is also 
disliked by Nietzsche for its deleterious political consequences. It holds back the development of 
the highest men by tethering slave and master together in peaceful mediocrity. The morals of the 
slave are only destructive and never creative; they only restrict the strong and never enhance 
growth. The opposition of a slave and master morality is a historical process akin to Hegel’s 
construction of Lord and Bondsman, but they find themselves in different locations and reach 
towards opposite ends. If Hegel works to “ensure the future to the bondsmen,” then Nietzsche 
finds that we already live in a time of slave morality (Strong, 251). He desires another period of 
master morality exemplified by the rise of a new nobility and, ultimately, the dominance of the 
overman (Strong, 237). The rise of slave morality in modern culture is tied to the supremacy of 
Socratic and Christian thought, while the return of a master morality is Nietzsche’s dream 
towards the goal of the overman. Master morality is characterized by the creative, legislative 
authority of the higher ranks. “The noble type of person feels that he determines value, he does 
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not need anyone’s approval, he judges that ‘what is harmful to me is harmful in itself,’ he knows 
that he is the one who gives honor to things in the first place, he creates values” (BGE, 154). The 
master is a practitioner of will to power as art. He creates values from out of his own limits. He 
identifies the good with himself and the bad as those things opposed to him. The good becomes 
the qualities of the nobility: power, dominance, “elevated proud states of the soul that are 
perceived as distinctive and as determining rank order” (BGE, 154). The master morality loves 
distinctions of rank and value judgements of individuals. Universal equality is entirely foreign to 
a world in which masters determine the moral structure. But, according to Nietzsche, we have 
not lived in such a world since the idealism of Plato came into play. Slave morality is the 
opposing movement. It is determined not by the positing of values from a creative and 
destructive energy, but out of a reactive, resentful attitude toward the morality of the masters. 
“The slave’s gaze resents the virtues of the powerful…it has a subtle mistrust of the “good” that 
is honored there —” (BGE, 155). Slave morality does not posit its own independent values. It is 
only destructive and not creative, only a no-saying and never a Yes! All of its values are 
established in reaction to the dominance of the master, and particularly the master’s definition of 
the “good” as its own dominance.  Thus, “qualities that serve to alleviate existence for suffering 
people are pulled out and flooded with light: pity, the obliging, helpful hand, the warm heart, 
patience, industriousness, humility…the desire for freedom, the instinct for happiness” (BGE, 
156). The values of the slave are not suited to striving for an improvement in the species or the 
culture. They are only suited to tolerating a life spent under foot. Instead of uplifting power and 
fullness, the slave loves those values that demand others reach down and lend a helping hand. 
They hold pity as a virtue not out of a creative defining of their own limits, but as a reactive need 
from their own sorry state. They push the value of freedom for the restrictions it places on the 
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master rather than seeking to grow in their own right. The slave hates the hierarchies of order 
that elevate the dominant type. Unsurprisingly, equality also finds its home among a slave 
morality. “the slaves' theory of suffrage universel and ‘equality’” (WP, 364). Both democracy 
itself and equality, its foundational principle, are found to be born from a slave morality. Tracy 
Strong describes, and I have adopted, a future transition from a slave morality to a master 
morality and finally to the superior, as yet unidentified morality of the overman. This means that 
Nietzsche calls for the politics of the future to abandon the values of pity, freedom, and equality 
in pursuit of the overman. As the transhumanists pursue their own version of the overman, the 
posthuman who lives far too long, they cling to the values of slave morality. They continue to 
vaunt freedom and equality in their tablets. This is a clear separation between the historical 
development of the overman that Nietzsche foresees and the transhumanist development of the 
posthuman. Nietzsche idolizes nobility and distinctions of rank, while the transhumanists cling to 
an equality that reeks of Christianity. Further, Nietzsche does not believe that any development 
of man can occur without such inequality. In his notebooks, Nietzsche repeats the claim found at 
the beginning of BGE Chapter 9, “inequality of rights, concealment, stoicism, tempter-art, 
devilry of every kind, in short the opposite of all herd-desiderata, are necessary for the elevation 
of the type man27” (WP, 957). For Nietzsche, any improvement of man must come through the 
development of a new nobility at the cost of the downtrodden. It must abandon the stasis and 
                                                     
27 I feel a responsibility to acknowledge that the quote continues in a way that could offer an out to the 
transhumanists should they want to follow Nietzsche’s project, but I doubt it is one they would take up. “A morality 
with such inverse intentions, which wills to breed man to the heights, instead of to the comfortable and mediocre, a 
morality with the intention to breed a governing caste -- the future masters of the earth -- must, in order to be able to 
be taught, introduce itself in connection with the standing customary laws and under their words and semblances; 
but that to this end many means of transition and deception are to be invented” (WtP, 957). The old values can be 
taken up as a mask to disguise the coming of a master morality. The only transhumanist who I would attribute this to 
is Max More, who finds himself inspired directly by Nietzsche. His value of Open Society is qualified by the 
potential need to transform our values. Even then, this transformation is only acceptable to him with the “consent of 
those involved.” This seems to maintain a call for the values of equality and voluntary association that is very far 
from the relation of master and slave or even nobility and serf.  
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resentment of slave morality and acknowledge that supreme cultural heights can only be 
achieved when a select few dominate the rest. The transhumanists bring slave morality into their 
project of enhancing man, and distance themselves from Nietzsche in so doing—both in his 
hatred of slave morality and in his understanding of the cultural elevation of man through 
nobility.  
 
Anti-Christ 
 The Anti-Christ is the last book written and published by Nietzsche before his mental 
breakdown. It launches a brutal attack on Christianity. I would like to highlight three points of 
his critique. First, he argues that the immortality of the soul, similarly proffered by 
transhumanists More and de Grey, saps the meaning from life. Second, Nietzsche finds the 
equality of souls before God to be the origin of the political value of equality. He scorns both 
equalities as antithetical to a natural fact of life, the ordering of the castes. Third, he again 
affirms that the surpassing of current man is only possible in political systems of rigid inequality. 
 For the sake of an ordering of Nietzsche’s texts, I must return now to the argument of the 
last section with a twist. I previously argued that Nietzsche was against the extension of life as a 
rule and as a method for reaching towards the overman. I held the assumption that Nietzsche 
would absolutely not tolerate immortality for its relation to the Christian afterlife and the eternal 
truth of Plato’s idea. Here, I present the latter claim to you in Nietzsche’s own words.  
The enormous lie of personal immortality destroys all reason, everything natural in the 
instincts, — everything beneficial and life-enhancing in the instincts, everything that 
guarantees the future, now arouses mistrust. To live in this way, so that there is no point 
to life anymore, this now becomes the ‘meaning’ of life…you cannot heap enough 
contempt on this, every type of selfishness increasing shamelessly to the point of infinity 
(AC, 43) 
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Both More and de Grey promise the immortality of the soul. More through the freezing of your 
brain and de Grey through the simultaneous immortality of your body. But Nietzsche does not 
even specify the soul. He derides “personal immortality” on two counts. First, it removes the 
meaning of life. Second, it represents the maximal extension of personal selfishness.  
The first is a very existential point. Nietzsche claims that life is meaningless without 
death, as an end and a limit. It orients our instincts in relations of will to power. Every 
overcoming of a limit is in the context of the final, inescapable limit. Each conflict between two 
wills risks the death of one or the other. The immense significance of the conflict is defined by 
this danger. We overcome out of our need to grow, yes, but also out of the need to not be 
overcome in ourselves. It is the looming fear of death, sometimes close and sometimes far, that 
quickens our pace. When we work towards a goal, like the overman, we know that we may not 
reach it, and we establish heirs to pursue this goal in our stead. In a world of personal 
immortality, there is no urgency and no danger, no need to grow and expand. There is no point in 
“working towards any common goal or even keeping one in mind” (AC, 43). The birth of the 
overman comes through our own downgoing. All goals are raced towards or left to our children 
in the shadow of death. Nietzsche’s very lust for life, proclaimed again and again throughout his 
work, is born from an intimate relationship with sickly liminal experiences, from the nearness of 
death. Without such a final limit, complacency falls on us too easily and we are left blinking like 
the last man (who lives longest).  
Nietzsche’s discovery of life’s meaning in death recalls Heidegger’s notion of being-
towards-death. “Death is a possibility of being that Da-sein always has to take upon itself. With 
death, Da-sein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being” (Being and Time, 50). 
Man constantly confronts his own death. For, Heidegger, the manner of this confrontation should 
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not be a constant thinking about or less an active causing, but an anticipation. The anticipation of 
his own death reveals to him his individuality, his ownmost self separated from the mass ‘they,’ 
and his very potential.  Heidegger uses the word potential in a double way. He defines death as 
the angst inspiring potential to not be, both in concert with others and in one’s own self. So 
potential is one’s very existence and the possibility of its end. The second meaning reveals 
Nietzsche’s own angst about the disappearance of the goal and point of life. The revelation of a 
man’s potential also comes when he organizes himself in relation to his goals. In a paragraph that 
quotes Nietzsche, Heidegger writes, “Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees 
one from one’s lostness in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical 
possibilities lying before the possibility not-to be-bypassed can first be authentically understood 
and chosen” (Being and Time, 53). When one acknowledges the ever-present possibility of 
death, one gains a new kind of freedom. A new urgency is brought upon us. We become centered 
in the now by the realization of a final limit. Instead of being adrift in a sea of meaninglessness, 
lost in nihilism, we can grasp and choose among the manifold possibilities that lie before that 
final eventuality. The finality of death, the anticipation of one’s non-being, orients one among 
the chaos of life. It provides a pressure to achieve and strive. It drives man to greater heights and 
the achievement of his goals. It reveals to man both who he is alone and what he wants most, 
exactly because there is not an infinite amount of time to try everything. Personal immortality 
removes all of the immediacy from life. It breeds contentment. Without the looming end, we are 
unable to find our place in the world or the need to reach for the place we want to be. I take an 
existentialist understanding of Nietzsche’s relationship to death. The defined limit enhances the 
life. It empowers the need to overcome. The goal of the overman provides a twist. Our overgoing 
is also our downgoing, our goal is also our grave. The unity of goal and grave, usually opposed, 
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places the pure striving of life above all else. I believe it has the potential to rescue us from 
nihilism. The posthuman reaching beyond the Earth cannot. The transhumanists sap the conflict 
and meaning from life in exactly the same way as Christianity—through the promise of personal 
immortality.  
Nietzsche’s second critique of personal immortality is a bomb I would happily lob at any 
transhumanist. What makes you so fucking special that you should live forever—that you are 
good enough to become the overman? Is Aubrey de Grey a master, that aristocratic legislator that 
Nietzsche so admires? I doubt it. When we make a time capsule in our backyard, we choose the 
best and most representative items—those things that need to be preserved and revealed to future 
generations. When we send records into space in the hopes of reaching some distant alien 
species, we send The Beatles. When Max More freezes a brain for revival at the dawn of the 
posthuman, he takes anyone with enough money (or anyone willing to deny their children a life 
insurance payout). The transhumanists are not preserving and enhancing the best and the 
brightest today. They are preserving and enhancing those who are selfish enough to believe they 
can become the apex of human evolution with just a bit more time, a bit more science, and a bit 
less self-reflection.  
Particularly interesting to my argument is the connection Nietzsche draws between the lie 
of personal immortality and equality. Not only are they the twin lies of Christianity, but it is also 
the immortality of the soul, bestowed to all individuals, that justifies the doctrine of equality. 
Each is made equal to all in the universal relation to eternity.  “That as immortal souls, everyone 
is on the same level as everyone else, that in the commonality of all beings, the ‘salvation’ of 
each individual lays claim to an eternal significance…’Salvation of the soul’—in plain language: 
‘the world revolves around me’…The poisonous doctrine ‘equal rights for everyone’” (AC, 43). 
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The value of equality is born out of the promise of a universal, eternal relation to God. In God’s 
eternal love, all can find solace in his embrace, all are equal before his eyes, and so should be 
treated as such in the political orders of the world28. Both values, immortality and equality, flatter 
our “vanity” and selfishness (AC, 43). They tell us we are good enough, as good as anyone else 
who is or will be, and good enough even to live forever. Immortality and equality are 
concomitant values. Nietzsche hates both. First for their Christian origin, but also for the 
unearned self-satisfaction they bestow upon every person without distinction. The overman is the 
positing of a better man. It demands contempt from yourself and never contentment. 
Transhumanism similarly plays on an acknowledgement of our personal worth. The time 
is now for human to become posthuman, they say. We are ready to ascend into the superior, 
transformed plane. I don’t buy it, but we have revealed an interesting trick in interpreting 
transhumanism’s relation to Nietzsche. Transhumanism preaches immortality and equality. This 
mirrors the logical unity that Nietzsche identifies to critique Christianity. We already know that 
transhumanism does not follow in Nietzsche’s footsteps. They perpetuate the values of a slave 
morality that stands “against health, beauty…against life itself” (AC, 62). And yet, they also 
preach the breeding of a higher man. This bears an immediate resemblance to Nietzsche’s 
overman. Immortality and life extension are not the way to enhance “the type man,” but neither 
is equality. Nietzsche praises nobility and divisions of rank as raising the higher men to their 
highest point. Only a select few can be raised, and they must be raised by the work and utility of 
the lower classes. This is the joke: the transhumanists have taken a strictly corporeal 
understanding of the overman and dressed it in the trappings of slave morality. They have 
stripped Nietzsche of his recognition of death and radical political ideals. If transhumanism is 
                                                     
28 “in earth as it is in heaven” (Matthew 6:10, KJV) 
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Nietzsche, then it is only a Nietzsche made palatable to we who live in the shadow of God, and 
this is no Nietzsche at all. The overman is born out of Nietzsche’s need to overthrow the lies of 
immortality and equality raised to prominence by Socrates and Christ. He, the overman and 
Nietzsche, cannot be removed from his political context and repurposed for the technocratic 
ideals of a group of men selfish and cowardly enough to believe they should live forever. 
Foreshadowed in “What is noble?” Nietzsche reaffirms the need for social hierarchy in 
his adoration of the Code of Manu. Nietzsche raises the Code of Manu in opposition to the 
“despicable” values of Christianity (AC, 57). Unlike the life degrading messages of the beyond, 
immortality and its cohort equality, “preserves and defends life” by maintaining a political order 
of castes akin to the natural division of peoples (Berkowitz, 110).  The mission of the Code of 
Manu, and any appropriately designed law book in Nietzsche’s eyes, is to allow for the 
improvement of the culture. This means increasing the health, power, and perfection of the 
highest class. The end of law is to “give a people the right to become master one day, to become 
perfect, — to aspire to the highest art of life” (AC, 57). Note that Nietzsche marks two familiar 
terms, master and art. In master he calls for the historical transition to a master morality of 
domination and rank from out of the slave moralities of equality and Christianity. In art he asks 
for the creation and destruction of law from out of semblance. The good law is asked to create 
good lawmakers, creators and destroyers of law. This is the answer to Roger Berkowitz’ 
“dangerous paradox of the art of legislation” (Berkowitz, 115). Any law threatens to “petrify into 
a lifeless and will-less morality of justification” (Berkowitz, 117). True, but an appropriate, life 
and hierarchy-affirming law creates the very creative legislators most capable of destroying that 
law when it grows stale. Even as Nietzsche admires the codification of created truth in the Code 
of Manu, he recognizes its temporal and earthly nature. The values inscribed there will be 
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surpassed when the best have outgrown them. New laws will be manufactured once the culture 
has progressed beyond the old (BGE, 262). Eternity cannot be tolerated; it is not the way of life 
and becoming. This recalls the transhumanist invitation to reexamine old values, but it does not 
relate to their stubborn cling to equality. That is a value grown stale and eternal for Nietzsche. 
Already in the 19th century he felt it was deleterious to life, a slave morality. In The Anti-Christ 
most of all, he demands that it be destroyed and replaced with a life-affirming aristocracy. The 
transhumanists do not answer this call. Worse still, their attempt to breed a higher man from out 
of the fallow ground of equality is utterly backwards in Nietzsche’s scheme of cultural 
improvement.  
What Nietzsche loves most in the Code of Manu’s right to mastery is its adherence to the 
natural order of inequality. “Caste-order, order of rank, is just a formula for the supreme law of 
life itself, splitting off into three types is necessary for the preservation of society, to make the 
higher and highest types possible—unequal rights are the condition for any rights at all” (AC, 
57). Organized inequality, a codified hierarchy, is favored by Nietzsche for two reasons. First, it 
aligns with the supreme law of life. Life as will to power denotes competition and striving, but 
this conflict cannot be constant. The weaker must submit to the strong lest they be destroyed. 
The strong find no advantage in challenging the similarly strong. Individual wills settle into 
organizations of rank, relations of dominator and dominated, in the interstices of struggle. Life as 
will to power is the constant battle for rank and domination, and the organized hierarchy is its 
momentary resting place. Equality denies the constant striving for growth and overcoming that 
Nietzsche takes to be the very definition of life. A life-affirming political order must allow for 
distinctions between wills of different magnitude.29 Second and most importantly for the mission 
                                                     
29 What the logic of will to power further suggests, though Nietzsche does not seem to account for it in the rigidity 
of the caste structure, is the need for mobility among the ranks. Although he believes in the inheritance of weakness 
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of breeding a higher species, be it posthuman or overman, it makes the development of “the 
higher and highest types possible” (AC, 57). The development of a cultural rarefication required 
to write and surpass laws, the overcoming of both body and soul necessary to one day bring 
about the overman, is founded on the pursuit of the best and only the best, while the rest work at 
the bare necessities of political life. 
The Code of Manu demands three, defined castes. Nietzsche finds that these correspond 
to natural temperaments and fulfill societal needs. Each needs the others to function, but each 
represents a different quantity of value and so is afforded different rights and responsibilities. 
The highest, strongest, and fewest are the legislators. They are “spiritual people” with ascetic 
natures (AC, 58). They embody the highest form of will to power, and from out of it, they make 
art. “Only these ‘most spiritual men’ have the privilege to establish beauty and the good upon the 
Earth” (Berkowitz, 108). Those enshrined in the highest caste are tasked with creating law from 
out of semblance. All cultural improvement occurs at this rank. Already at the height of their 
culture, they raise themselves when they overcome an old truth and craft a new one more in line 
with life. The second order guard the law. They are the warriors and kings. They “take over 
everything crude in the art of ruling” (AC, 57). These muscular men enforce the laws of the 
highest caste, but they do not dictate them. The validity of those laws, though, does not come 
only from their enforcement. Laws gain truth from their adherence to life. From out of the raw 
material of the earth, the ascetic priests express their highest will to power to artistically create a 
truth that even they cannot overcome. There is a cultural and even spiritual experience that 
                                                     
(BGE, 264), surely not everyone born of an aristocratic rank will have the will of a master. The same follows with 
exceptional individuals born of a lower rank. The hierarchy of wills is established in lived conflict. It is not settled at 
birth like the castes. Strong writes, “One does not have slave morality in the same manner as one has social-
economic status, or even in the manner in which one is a negro or an Anglo-Saxon” (Strong, 239). Slave and Master 
moralities correspond to differing quantities of will to power. Strong argues that one is not born into a quantity of 
will as one is born into a caste. A given will to power will necessarily change and grow throughout life. 
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guarantees a law for as long as it cannot be overcome by another law more closely aligned with 
the life of the people (TSZ, 43). Still, as in Socrates’ healthy city, “guardians” are needed to 
mind the boundaries (AC, 57; Berkowitz, 108). The third and lowest caste is an interesting case. 
I have already cast them as the downtrodden and the proletariat, forced to work for the benefit of 
the higher castes. Nietzsche takes a very different view. He does not mention the material 
pleasures of wealth or the social benefits of a high class. Instead, he focuses on the pressure of 
problems and responsibilities, and he finds the lowest to be the most privileged. “Let us not 
underestimate the privileges of the mediocre. Life becomes increasingly difficult the higher up 
you go—it gets colder, there are more responsibilities” (AC, 57). The highest and strongest rise 
to a life of challenge and striving. The mediocre are satisfied with the happiness of employment. 
They are “destined by nature” to be a “public utility, a wheel, a function” (AC, 58). This seems 
to be a curious defense of class structure. The poor are said to be happy with their lot, while the 
upper classes face the hardship of decisions and power. The natural inclinations of each caste, 
the distinctions in their will to power or their need to strive, align with their societal position. 
“Everyone finds his privilege in his own type of being” (AC, 58). Nietzsche does not 
acknowledge any exploitation of the worker in the Code of Manu. Each finds their position 
according to their destiny. There is a natural order of inequality of will that is merely encoded 
into political structure. What is not unfamiliar is the reliance of the higher classes on the workers. 
Their striving is enabled by the, now happy, toil of the mediocre. “A high culture is a pyramid: it 
needs a broad base, its first presupposition is a strongly and healthily consolidated 
mediocrity…Mediocrity is needed before there can be exceptions: it is the condition for a high 
culture” (AC, 58). The development of a high culture requires that the spiritually mediocre fulfill 
their mediocre destiny, while the higher are freed to pursue cultural refinement, growth in their 
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will to power, and the very transcendence beyond the type man. Whether we have to imagine the 
workers happy or downtrodden, Nietzsche’s reading of the Code of Manu is unequivocal. It is 
precisely inequality that allows for the surpassing of man. The transhuman insistence on 
maintaining social equality and simultaneously enhancing and going beyond man is not a manner 
of social evolution that Nietzsche believes in. The striving to the heights of man and beyond 
requires distinctions of value and rank inconsistent with the equality of all souls. The 
transhumanist’s love of equality not only violates Nietzsche’s moral structure, it also undermines 
their project of improving man. Nietzsche finds that precisely inequality is optimal for the 
enhancement of the type man.  
 
 
Conclusion 
I argue that Nietzsche’s striving for the overman and the transhumanist pursuit of the 
posthuman stand apart on two important grounds.  
First, life extension, claimed by every transhumanist as the most important overcoming, 
does not take us further down the road to the overman. The overman as species is brought about 
through a generational churning of birth and death. It is a vision of ideal man only distinct from 
Christ’s message of Heaven in that you will never reach it yourself. It is precisely your death that 
allows your heirs to reach closer to the final goal. Placing immortality and perfection within 
human reach is Christian and idealistic. It breeds scorn for the impermanence and becoming of 
the Earth and the now. It ends in nihilism. The transhumanists peddle the same old story at a 
profit. They want the overgoing, but none of the downgoing. Zarathustra’s promise of species 
improvement is radical because he asks you to hang on the cross and receive no praise for it. 
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Everyone will do it in turn. And you should hurry up already! We could use the wood. Mankind 
is a rope, but we are nowhere near Nietzsche’s end. Many more bodies have to fall and try and 
try and fall before we reach the other side, if we ever do. The overman is a goal to constantly 
strive towards through generations. The posthuman is Nietzsche in Christ’s robes, a bad fit. 
Second, Nietzsche scorns equality. As ludicrous as it may be that transhumanism would 
produce greater equality, every transhumanist claims the value with gusto. More important than 
his hatred of equality and its Christian origins, is its inconsistency with his project of the 
overman. The higher and highest men of master moralities are born out of a radical aristocracy of 
profound inequality. The mediocre must be made even into slaves to fuel the enrichment of the 
upper class. Only from the best men and the highest men can the overman be born. Equality is 
old, Christian, and inefficient for traversing the bridge to the overman.  
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